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DTROllJ erlON 
The noted French painter Paul Cezanne once remarked. 111 have not 
reproduced nature, I bave represented it. How? In its plastic and colored. 
equivalents. ,,1 In these tew words 'Whether he realized it or not Cezanne 
has paid very eloquent tribute to a theory of art that is almost as old as 
art itself. For the opinion he expresses, tar trom being new, has ita 
origin in the distant past. 
To the ancient Greeks ve ot the occidental world owe a debt ot 
gratitude tor the artistic and cultural legacy they bestowed upon us. It 
VaS they who supplied both the exaaple and. the inSpiration trom which has 
a.r.taen mch of the litel'al"J" and cultural tradi ticm of the Christian 'World. 
Bat the Greek genius was not limited to the practical sphere ot making, 
they were also mch inclined to speculation, as the inpressive liSt of 
their renowned philosophers amply demonstrates. It is only natural t then, 
that the more inquisitive, the more profound, ot their thinkers 'Would not 
be content merely to enjoy l:eautiM art. They would not be satisfied 
untU they had co_ to an understanding ot its very essence. 
The world in 'Which these thinkers lived was adorned with some ot the 
Ifbntlngton Cairns, Great Paint!t¥s trom the National Galle!Z of Art 
(lew York, 19S2>. p. 1.66. - - - -
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noblest works ot art the world has ever known. The tellPles in which the,. 
worshiped, the tragedies and comedies Which they attended regularly, the 
stirring epic narratives, the najestic choral odes and the Simple lyrics 
in which they delighted, the polished, impassioned. oratory of which they 
were tODd - all these and many other things besides combined to tor.ll the 
highly cultured world in which they lived. It i8 only natural that men like 
Plato and Aristotle would ask themaelveal "What is art.? What is its 
essence'" 
at aU the anCients whose works are known to us, Plato is the first 
who attempted a 4et&Ued answer to that question. Doubtless, other thinkers 
ba4 pondered. it and bad proposed answers of their own. &t Plato's solution 
is the earliest that survives to Ils.Subseqllent aesthetic1ans have eyaluated 
Plato's theory in various w818. Some have adopted it with reservations, 
SO.118 have rejected it, while a few have neglected it altogether. But the 
8ignif'icant fact is that the basiC concept which Plato developed has found 
its .y into the works of art, critics wen d01lll to our present day so that 
we t1nd mtn like Oeunne .... cho1ng the sa_ basic notion onoe more. 
Plato believ'ed that art was essentially an 1a1tation or representatiOD 
ot nature. This is the position which he assumed in his early dialogu.es 
and trom which he never 4eparted.. In itself it seems to be a rather Simple, 
uncomplioated answer to the question. But here, u.nt'ortunatel.7, is one of 
those instanoes where appearances deceive. For as Verdenius has relllUked 
very accurately: -The concept ot imitation may be said to be the mat 
vexed problb of Plato" theol'T of art. No doubt hi. aesthetios oontain 
· ) 
more difficulties, but none at them has caused 80 mch misunderstanding."! 
In the pages that follow an atte~t has been made to grapple with tb1.s 
"most vexed. proble.,· and to clarity in some way the major points quite often 
"m18UD4eretooci. .. 
The Platonic approach to a~ has been nther s8V'erel.7 cr1tised. within 
recent t1Jllea. Art, so the modem aestbeticiana tell us, 18 not iJllitative 
or representational, it is essential.ly ereatiTe.) The artist should not 
restrict himself to copying, he sb.oul.d produce so_thing new. For art is 
selt-expre •• ion, it is giVing birth to a new reality_ SUrely such opinions 
are not without their mel"1t. To close one'. eyes to their worth would be 
to comnit the sin of intellectual narrowness which Plato himseU' 10 deprecated. 
On the other haDd, there are two things 1;hat should be noted with regard to 
this modem criticism of Plato. 
lint of all, soh of the crit1ciam lev'81ed againSt Plato i' based on 
an imperfect kno14edp of the precise Platonio c:loctrine. Some, for inStance, 
allege that Plato a.dYocated slavish realis. in art, that he neglected. the 
ideal 81..-1;. Others 1n8in tbat his whole approach is hopelessly OV'er-
inteUectu.&l. Still othen argue that he crrerlooked the creative aspect of 
art, altogether. A DOre caretul analysiS '0£ Plato t , own doctrine w1ll reT8al, 
ho .... er, that 1IIID7 of the .. contentions are not altogether verU.1able. 
Secondly, the preferabUity at th.1B nodern approach to art. in co.r180n 
2w.J.Verdenius, Mimesis. Platots Doctrine of Artistic Imitation and Its 
Mean1.l!i !.2 !! (Leiden, 1949~" lfHtace. - , - -
)A.C.Bradley I 0Jct0~ Lectures.!,.n Poetr,y (London, 1950) J p. 4-5. 
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to the ancient can at least be questioned. Without denying the obvious merits 
of the never theories we mst be careful not to discard what is of genuine 
worth in the older theories. In tact, a thorough study or the ancient 
phUosophers ot art may challenge us to reexamine and reevaluate OIlr own 
renections on the subject. In the process we may be surprised to I earn, 
as some ot our conteu;>orarles have, that the nore traditional theories ot 
art are not devoid of merit. 
This present study, then, i8 an attempt to analyze and evaluate the 
Platonic concept of artistic imitation. Its author will rest content it he 
succeeds in clarifying some of the more obscure points or Plato.s doctrine 
in the hope that a .,re comprehensive understand1ng and consequentl1' a JIOre 
intelligent appreciation of Plato's position will be possible. 
The general. sche_ ot the thesiS is Simple enough. In the tirst part 
an atteJq)t is made to a.nal.yse in detaU the philosophical foundation upon 
whioh Plato const.ructed his idea of an. Special attention is given to the 
concept of imitation as nato eJlilloyed it in his philosophy. Secondly, the 
PlatoniC concept ot artistic imitation is considered. In the next section 
several ot the objections more cOJl'lnODly leveled against Plato's theory are 
discussed, and, :finally, we attempt to point out brieny the permanent 
relnanee ot Plato's concept in the hiStory ot aesthetics. 
CHAPTER I 
THE PLACE OF "IMITATION" IN PLATO'S PHILOSOPHI 
As Prot. VeI'denius has very correctly observed, "The idea of iDd. tatlon 
i8 at the very center of Plato's phlloSO'Plv'."l Tbis sau opinion is shared 
by Ricbard. McKeon who has expressed it this way. im1tation "embraces the entire 
phUosophy of Plato. ,,2 It 'WOuld seem lOgical, then, that betore one under-
takes an analysis of Plato's notion of art.istic imitation he mst first 
understand the role that imitation plays in Platonic phUosophy as a whole. 
Suoh a method ot procedure has several obvious adYantages. First of all, 
since Plato's theory ot art is -1"817 a further development of his meta-
physios, a thorough knowledge ot the latter will serve as the best possible 
introduotion to the former. Secondly, a study of the phUosophlcal _anings 
of "i.m1.tation" will help us to understand and appreciate the aesthetic usage 
of the term. FinallYt the place of "1m1.tation" in Plato's philosophy is an 
important and enlightening study in its own right because, as both Verdenm8 
and MdCeon have polnt.ecl out, "1m1tation" i8 one of the fuDdamental concepts 
upon which Platonism is built. 
lVerdanius, P. 16. 
2Rlcbard McKeon. "Literary Criticism and the Concept of Imitation in 
Antiquity!" Critics and CriticiSm AnCient and Modern, ed. R.S.Crane 
( Chicago, 9~. ), p. m. -
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Our first task, then, will be to study the concept ot m1meall in Platonic 
phUosoplV', more particularly in his epistemolo81, his theory ot the torms, 
his physics and finally his phUosopl'o' of lango.age. Once this spade work 
has been done, we shall. be iD a better position to analyse and "&luate 
Plato.s concept ot artistiC imitation. 
Plato, like all the great philosophers ot every age, was deeply 
interested in the perplexing problem of human knowledge. The question 
troubled him a good deal, until at length he struck upon what seeEd to him 
the onlJ' intell1gent answer" The problem as Plato conceived it C&1l8 down to 
t.h1s. precisely what is knowledge? Is it perception, or "t1'l1e judgment-, or 
is it 80Mthtng more? On the one hand, hu-.n knowledge seems to begin with 
the Hnaible perception of corporeal beings. lht does th1S DOt lead to a 
GOnt_diction? Experience tells us that sensible objects are forever changing, 
are particUlar, aingular, and. purely contingent. Our concepts, on the other 
hand, are characterized by their iDlll\1iabUity, universality, and neoe88ity. 
How then can the former possibly be the cause of the lat1;er?.3 
In the Theaetet.u.a Plato has given ua a very cOl'lf)lete presentation ot 
what he beliwed knowledge was not. In thia dialogue the young .tbe-.tlcian 
Thea.tet.ua fJllters into a discussion with Socrates on the subject of knowledge. 
Upon being asked what he believes human knowledge to be, Theaetetus replie. 
that the Protagorean det inition of knowledge as mere sense perception see_ 
the moat sat1at'actory to him.4 Socrates, however, objects to this opinion 
.3Frederick Copleston, S.J., ! Htstory !?! PhUosop&,I" (Westminster, 
19~), pp. 149-1S!. 
4Plato, Theaetetus, 1$2 c, trans. B. Jowett, 4th ad. (Oxford" 19$3) 
IV" p. 2Ja6. 
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tor s_eraJ. rather weighty reasons. For one thing, Socrates remarkS, it 
knowledge is nothing more than perception how could it be said that one D8I1 
is wiser than another15 According to Protagol'ltll t suppos ition, is not 
knowledge a purely relative matter? Does not wery nan become his own 
ulti-.te criterion of right and wrong, good and 'bad? For atter all, who is 
in a better position to pass judgment on one's own perceptions than the man 
b1maelt? Clearly, then, while your perceptions may be true for you, mine 
are tNe for me, and neither 'of us can boast of being wiser than the other. 
But Socrates bas not yet finished with Protagoras. It knowledge and 
wisdom aft relative matters, why do sophists like ,rotagoras deceit.tull7 
PO" as teaohers and unscNpu.ou.sly aooept handsome swns of money for the ir 
se1Ti .. .,6 \i.by should alV"one sit and liSten 1;0 their lecturea it 'one manta 
lmow1edge 18 as good as another's' 
Furthe .. , Socrates oontinues, a_e perception 1. surely not the whole of 
our lal.Qw~. For we 00 .. to an understanding of nany things such aa 
existence and non-ex!st.enoe, the conclusions to sthemat1cal. problems, 
8alIIm88S and dUEerence, all ot whiCh 1a'anscend Illre sense perceptions. 7 
As a resu.lt of these rather telling &rgtUl8nta Theaetetus sees that his 
f1rst definition of knowledge is untenable. However, he tr1es another. 
Perhapa, he rearks, knowledge 18 true judgment or opinion. 8 This definition 
'xbid. 161 d, Jowett IV, p. 2!)8-2,9 
-
6xbid. 161 d-e, Jowett, p. 2,9 
7Iblci. 18, o-d, Jowet.t, p. 286 
6~. 200 e, Jowett, p. )06. 
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does not sat1st)' Socrates any more than the tlrat. He objects to It on the 
score that not all true judgments need neee.sarUy imply knowledge on the 
part, ot the one _1ng theL9 An .. ~e may perhaps lIIlke Socrates' meaning 
clearer. Suppose I were to says President EIsenhower is playing golf this 
altemoon. "" statement -1 be true. Bu.t the tact of the _tter Is that 
I do not know whether 1t Is tne or not since I have no idea of what 
Mr. EIsenhower Is doing this afternoon. Acc !dentally, I my have judged 
correctly, but • judgment 1lIIplied no real knowledge on I\Y part. Socrates' 
argument aga1nat Theaetetus t second definition of knowledge is precise17 
this. Clearly, then, knowledge is not simply true judgment and Theaetetus 
1s asked to suggest another defin.it1on ot knowledge. 
Tbeaetetu.s' thIrd and tiDal attempt 11 no mJ'8 successful than either 
ot the previous two. Being hard pressed Theaetatus suggests that true 
knowledge is "true judgment plus a rational expla.nation or account. alO 
&1t again, Socrates bas an answer ready at hand. If "giving a ratIonal 
explaDatlonlt naans an analysls into parts, it Is hard to see' how It could 
lead to genuine knowledge. ODe does not co .. to a sclentitlc knowledge 
of a wilgon, tor example, by enumerating Its parts (axle, wheels, etc.), 
nor does one acquire the grammarian's knowledge of language merely by 
learning the alpbabet.U Socrates then goes on to demonstrate that, in 
9Ibid. 201 a-o, Jowett, p. 106-107. 
1~. 201 d, Jowett, p. 307. 
Ulb1d. 207 a - 208 0, Jovett, p • .3l4-315. 
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whatever sense one takes the phrase "plus a rational e.xpl&nation," it does 
not explain the. essential nature of lmowledge. 
Anet ~o the question remains, what is knowledge? In several. ot bis 
dialogues Plato proposes his own answer to this question. For Plato there 
was notbing quite so evident than that tNe knowledge vas attainable &lid 
that it was of the intalllble and the "real.! -True knowledge _st possess 
both of these characteristics, and aD;)'" state of mind that cannot vindicate 
its claim to both. •• eannot be true knowledge. ,,12 This baSic supposition, 
which, inc1dental.l.7, Plato does not atterq;>t to prow-e, is ot utrems importance 
ill Platonio ep1Ste~lo8'1. 
To Heraclitus Plato conceded that the sensibly perceptible world was 
tonrrer in flux, con:posed, as it is, of contingent, singular objects 
perpetually undergOing Changes of varioua kinds.l ) But againSt any aIId 
flYery torm of SophistiC relativism Plato maintained that absolute knowledge 
8S attainable. Man.can aDd does know the eternal, 1mmu.table, necesS&17' 
essences ot thiDgs.14 The problem, as Plat.o saw it, was how to reconcUe 
thue two facta; t.he stability and universality of knowledge on the ODe 
band, and the conatant change and individuality of perceived objects on the 
other. 
Plato n..,er developed a theory ot mental abstraction as Aristotle did 
after him. Tbe Stag1rite later answered. the problem of universal knowledge 
l2copleston, p. 149 
llneaetetus, 1-'2 d-e, .lovett, pp. 247-248. 
l.hRe,ebl1C, 484 b, Jowett, II, p. 3h2 
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by pointing out 1;h.at the miad itself grasps the .ssential eleaent of the 
sensible singular and lmOlfS that ele_nt abnraotly and 1ndependent17 of 
its1nd1viduat1.ng notes. Plato, unaware of such a 801ut10n drew the oDl¥ 
conclusion that seemed plausible to M... Th. perpetuall¥ changing be1ngs 
of lanse perception are not the obj.cts of intell.ctual knowledge because 
th.y are not stable nor are they "real.~ the tm8 objects of intellectual 
knowledge aN the Wl!versal, 8aaent1al forms or ideas the .... lv •• which 
:really exist 111 a world of their own.l ' Since knowledge it.elf is of the 
1mmu.1;able andtmiveraal, Plato argued, only the Wlivel'88.l. essences themselves 
could be its object. What then is the role of s.naible realiti1 Plato· 
aDh'ered thia question quite easUy. S-'ibl. objects res.mble the ideal 
tOl'Jll because they participate in them and. im1.tate the .. 1.6 Thus they become 
the occasion of our kDovle4ge in that they reoall. to mind. the 14 .. which 
they reaembl •• 
ThwIwaa conc.ived Plato'. theory of knowledge l:t1 rem1n1sence which has 
caused. a good deal of contl'OVel'll7 among 8cholara. Aotua1l.7, the theor.y 'Was 
mra or 1 ••• the ine9'itable concl.u810n of Plato'. approach to epist • .,logy. 
Having stated t.bat th. obj.ct of'mtel1ectual knowledge _s the .ternal 
forms alone he W8 COIPeUed to apla1l:l how and wh.n man came to know those 
obj.ct. and secondly how he ca_ to recall them. In the Phaedo h. proposes 
his c.lebrated solution to these rather knotty questions. 
!he .0111, Socrates tells hiS fnends, existed prior to its entrance 
15Plato, B;ePubllc 152 d-e, Jowett, n, pp. )72-375. 
l.6Plato, Parmen1des. 132 d, Jowett, II, P. 676. 
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lnto this world.17 lhr1ng that period ot pre-co:rporeal existence it con-
tenplatecl the ... .nce of beauty, goodness, aDd all the other absolutes. 
At the time of blrt,h, h01ftWer, man torgets thiS knowledge and would newer 
regaa it except for the fact that S8Dlle objects resemble the ideas and 
henee help h1a recall the knowledge that he possessed prior to birth.18 
Whether the theory of reJldni.ence actually represents Platots mature 
opinion on this subject or whether it 1& a tentative, hypothetical solut-ion of 
hitI _rUer ye&r8 is disputed by scholars. Corntont19 and Tayl0r20 apparent-
l;y bell..,e that the theory represents Plat,o's true mind on the subject, but 
Copleston i8 not, quite so sure. 21 So tar as the present consideration 18 
oonoemed, ho'ttwer, it makes little d1f'ference who is right. What does 
concem us now is the more fundamental assertion that true knowledge 
tanscends sensation altopt-her. For Plato the world of sense experienoe, 
as Taylor N78, "always falls short- of a co~let,e realization of the fOl'll,·22 
and. HDaible objects are theretore ~ 1a1tatlou of reality. 
The real key t,o t1'\1e knowledge, then, is the realisation that sense 
objects an at- beat faulty 1JI1tations of reallt7 aad tzutb itself. Tbis is 
the point- wbich ill of i..,ortance heft. In the R!pu.bl~ Plato bas explained 
at-length precisely what- he _nsf 
17P1at,o, Pbaedo, 73 a - 760, Jowett, I, pp. 42$-4)0. 
18Ibid,.. Also !!!.!!2. 81 ... 86b, Jowett, I, pp. 278-285. 
-
19h'ancls M. Comf'ord, Plato'~ Theory 2f. Knowled&! (London, 1935), 
pp. 2, 129. 
2"'.I.Taylor, Plato, !!!! !!!l !!!S His ~ (llew York, 1936), pp. 186-189. 
21Cop1eston, pp. 168-169_ 
22ra lor Plato The Man • 188. 
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In the tifth book of the ~!publiC Plato divides all knowledge into two 
general categories, ~~ sa andE71lf"r~}I,23 Each of these is redivided into 
, 
two parts. ~O~'" I he explainS, is knowledge ot sensible object or images, 
,) , 
whUe EllLtJ'r"lJ, is knowledge ot the torms or the originals themselves. 
So~ is ot two kirds. There is t£ !(aUto. whose object is mere shadows or re-
flections ot sensible realities. The works of second-rate painters might 
, , 
vell be an object of such knOWledge. TlLcrrL 5 is the second type ot &05"'. 
It has for its object the sensibly perceptible beings of every day experience. 
, 
For example, to know a just nan or a just constitu.tion would be 7ffCrn S. It 
is knowledge of sorts I bu.t only the knowledge of justice in 1tse1£ is really 
worthy of the name. 
,) , 
tT1lo-r"U'l or genuine wisdom is siJll1.larly of two kindS, the first being 
Is ' ol~VOLOC. As to the precise nature of (dVDL~ the scholars are at varianoe. 
Hettlesship prefer to take S L~ VOlO't as that _thematical or scienti!lc know-
ledge Which is built on bastc, unproven postulates and axioms. 
I 
Plato tells us further thatSLcAVOLO( reasons from 'hypotheses'. 
Plato meant by a hypothesis a truth which is assumed to be ultimate 
or primary when it really depends upon some higher truth; not that 
it is untrue or could ever be proved. false, but that U~ is treated 
tor the present as selt-comUtioned ••• Arithmetic and geometry re.t 
upon certain assuD\'>tions or hypotheses. The ultimate 3.3sun;>tion of . 
arithnetic 18 number, with its primary properties of odd and even. 
The arithmetician does not expect to have to live an account of 
this J if any one denies the existence of number I the possibility ot 
his studying arithmetic is destroyed, but, granted number as a 
starting-point the arithmetician reasons from it connectedly and con-
Sistently 1,1. and discovers from it any particular arithmetical truth 
he wants. "If 
23Plato, Re2ubJ.,ic, 509d-511e, Jowett, II, 1'1'* 372-315. 
24Richard L. Nettleship, Lectures on the Republic of Plato, ad. by 
Lord Charnwood, 2nd ed. (London, 19~9);-p7252. -
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A. E. Ta110:25 and Cop1eston,26 although their ultim8.te explanations 
, , 
are quite different, agree thatc5t~ VOl'" haa as its own peculiar object To( 
M(j. S'1lPrATd(a. Unlike the -zG( op"r~, the cC:C ~9").ICl1iI(rJ. are intelligible 
particulars. In so far as its object belongs to the intelligible order, 
, , 
SL~V'OC.~ dUrers frolllcSOS~. In so fei.- as its object is particular it is 
I 
distinguished from VO '»Iel"L S. 
I V 0 .., cr t 5 , however, is the sUlJlJ1i t of intellectual perfection. There the 
mind leaves behind the sensible and the partiCular and. soars to a knowledge 
, 
of reality itself. IIl1>1oying the hypotheses of SLd. VOLo( as a starting point 
the phUoaopher "passes beyond them and ascends to first principles. ~27 By 
means of the dialectical process he contemplates the ideas themselves. And 
"having clearly grasped the first principles, the mind then descends to the 
conclusions that follow from them, again naking use only ot abstract reason-
1~ and not of sensible 1mages.1t26 Therefore, the ideas themselves which, 
it should be remembered, are ontological.17 as well as logically real, tur-
, 
Dish the true object ot "0"lcr(S. Plato's famous cave allegory whIch opens 
book s1& is but an illustration of this so-called. "siroUe of the line." 
Aocording to Plato, therefore, that llJln alone is wise who perceives 
the essent1.al17 "imitative- nature of the sensible world. The men, the 
2Sraylor, "torms am Numbers," ~, XXXV (Oct. 1926), pp. 419-440. 
26Copleston, p. 156-157. (Jan. 1921), pp. 12-33. 
27 Ibid. p. 159. 
-26~. 
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animals, the justice, the goodness which we perceive in our every day lLfe 
merely copy or mirror man, horse, justice as they really are. Hence the 
philosopher aware of this world's imperfect and inconstant nature rises above 
it to the t«>rld of transcendent reality, to the abode of the ideas themselves. 
Theae epistemological considerations naturally give rise to several 
dUficn! ties of a more me1;aphysical nature. For example, how and why do the 
objects of sensation resemble the ideas? That there is some connection be-
tween them in the PlatoniC universe is 8V'ident from Platots theory of know-
ledge. &It. as yet he has not told us the nature of source of this relation. 
The problem by Platols own admission is a difficult one and it mst l:e said 
that Plato never really answered it even to his own satisfaction. v.1hat 
answer he did propose, however, bas a direct bearing on the Subject under 
conaider.ation at present. 
In themaelvea the for. are nothing else than absolute essences of created 
things. As Xhonnard has pointed out these absolutes are distinguished by four 
characteristiC qualities. 29 In the fint place they are totally spiritual, 
that is they enja.y some form of ontological existence independent or matter 
and are perceived immediately by the mind alone. Further, they are not 
merely concepts bu.t poesess fun ... fledged extra-mental ex1et.ence, although, as 
Copleston has very astutely pointed out this does not mean that the,y exist in 
some real place. "There can be no question of the Ideas being in a place for 
.!! hle2thesi they are incorporeal essences and incorporeal essencea cannot be 
I 29F.J.TholUJ8rd , PreciS D'H1sto1re de la PhUosoEhie, Nouvelle Edition, 
revue at corrigee (Paris, r9~l), pp. 51=>2:-
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in a place. It. is absurd to speak as though the Platonic theory involved. the 
assu~t.ion of an Ideal man with length, breadth, etc., existing in a heavenly 
place. To do so is to make the Platonic theory grattlltotlsly ridiculous. ,,30 
'h1J1ere, then, do these Ideas exist it they do not occupy a corporeal 
, 
place? According to Plato they abide in the heavenly sphere, the To 7705 
, 
Vo,?ro~ where the gods and the souls ot the blessed contemplate them. The 
, 
(01105 is described in the Phaedrus as tollowsr "Now of the heaven which is 
above the heavens no earthly poet has ever sung or ever will Sing in a worthy 
manner. But I must tell, tor I am bound to speak truly when speaking ot the 
truth. The colorless and formless and intangible essence is visible to the 
min4 which is the only lord of the soul. Circling around this in the region 
above the heavens is the place of true knowledge.n)OA 
Thirdly, the ideas are ilmlutable and eternal, and lastly they are 
"pure," or as Thonnard 8XprHaes it, "Chacune dans son ordre est parfaite J 
on pourrait les dire lnfinies." Furthermore, they are "absolurnent 
I I determ1n8esJ rien ne reste obscur en elles pour llesprit, •• elles se dlstln-
guent parfaitement les unes des autres.n.31 
FUrther, among these nu.erous subsistent forms we tind that Plato has 
established a hararetv' ot grades. At the very summit there resides as the 
soyereign form absolute goodneas. In the RepubliC Plato tells us that the 
idea of the good is "the universal author of all things beautiful and right, 
parent of light and the lord of light in this world, immediate and supreme 
3Ocopleston, p. 168. 
JOAPhaedrus, 247 B. 
31Thonnard, p. 52. 
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source of truth and reason in the intellectual ... 32 In an earlier passage he 
remarks that "the good is not essence, but far exceeds essence in dignity and 
power." Further, the good is "not only the source ot intelligibility in all 
objects ot knowledge, but also of their being and essence. tt3J It would weill, 
then, that according to Plato the "good" as the supremely real transcends 
essence yet is the cause or principle of the being and essence ot all things.34 
The good or one, then, as the source of all reality, stands at the summit 
of Plato's hierarchy of forms. Felow it, however, we find the other subsis-
tent ideas ranging trom those nearest to the idea of the "good," and hence the 
richest and the most real, all the way down to the intimae SF!cie. or the 
)l )'~ ro~~ £(0') , which represent the most specifiC and 10liest grade ot ideas. In 
the Sgphist, Plato explains that each of the ideas has a definition which can 
, 
be arrived at by dividing the notion (StG((ptCTLS) into genus and specific dif-
ference. Plato speaks as though a generic form 18 one and <it the same time 
many. It is many in that it pervades the subordinate specifiC torms somehow 
or other, -blending" with each of them yet retaining its own Wlit7.35 There 
I 
is a CO_union <It'oc. Vc,,)VL09 between torms, and the more generic partakes ot 
(pET£Xttv') the specifiC forms. 36 Thus, tor example, the form "an1mal" is 
32RepUbllg, 5l7b-c, Jowett, II, p. 379. 
33Ibid. 509b., Jowett, II, p. 372. 
34u we can trust Aristotle's testinony on the point, Plato 'Was accus-
tomed to identitY the good with the "one." Aristotle, Eudemian EthiCS, 
1218 a, 24. 
3SPlato, Sophist, 253 d, Jowett, III, pp. 407-408. 
J6Copleston, p. 185. 
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one, yet at the same time it is many, since it "blends" with or "partakes in" 
the universal forms of "dog," "horse" or "man." Similarly, "being" is one yet 
it pe:nrades all the lower, sul::ordinate forms. J7 Hence Plato established a 
neat hierarchy of subsistent ideas beginning with the most generic at the sum-
mit of the pyramid and finishing with the most specific at the pyramid's base. 
JI JI '1'hes.Q(rO)l~ etb'J, then, constitute the lowest rung on the ladder and below 
them there is nothing except the individual objects of sense perceptions. 
So much tor the ideas themselves and their inter-subordination. A more 
in:portant question now confronts us. It the heaven of Ideas alone is really 
being; whUe the world ot phenomena is mere becOming and it the Ideas are both 
the cause and the exemplar at sensible things, how is the inter-connection to 
be explained? The chasm separating the intelligible from the sensible world 
i8 indeed a wide one, and it should be admitted at the outset that Plato never 
adequately b,ridged it. He tried valiantly, but never quite succeeded. 
To the end Plato inSisted that the sense world was only imperfectly real 
and what reality it possessed was due to the resemblance it t~ore to the Ideas. 
In the Par~aenides Plato explains this relation as, 1) a participation 
I . I ~t If 5 t 5) in the Ideas and as 2) an imitation" lJJ- ,,<r' ~ of the Ideas, 'tihe 
I 
Idea serving as the ex:srrplar or"T/fA(XAal'I1/t1dt while the particular objects are 
the~,uotc:,r",lCc or)U).l~,tl~rGl.38 Such explanations lead to innlltl8ral::le diffi-
culties, a8 Plato himself was aware. He conSiders a few of them in the 
Parn:enides. Eut he never discovered any really adequate answers even 
37SoEhi~~, 254 c-d, Jowett, III, pp. 408-409. 
38parmenides, 132 d, Jowett, II, p. 676. 
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to these selfwproposed objections. As a result the X~fH6")lOSthat separated 
the intelligible trom the sensible was never satisfactorily eliminated. 
Copleston remarks. "Plato very probably considered that by bringing down the 
}I'oms, ~ the process of division, to the border of the sensible sphere, he 
'oJ 'C Tc 
was providing a connect1ng link between To( o(o~Td\ and To( or" 01. It may 
be that the relation between the ind1.viduals and the infimae species was to 
be elUCidated in the Philosopher, the dialogue which, it is conjectured, was 
once intended b,y Plato to follow the Statesman and which was never written, 
but it cannot be said that the chasm was ever satisfactorily bridged, and the 
, 
problem of the XWPl(fJ-f0S remained. fl39 
Wbat this explanation does establish quite clearly, however, is what we 
might call the metaphysical significance of imitation in Platonic philosophy. 
The sensible world, in so far as it has a raison d tatre at all, derives it from 
the fact that it mimics the real. world of Ideas. Perhaps the notion is unsat-
isfactory and inadequate in ma~ ways. But is is essentially Platonic and, as 
will be pointed out later on, formed the basis of his entire aesthetic theory. 
In the Timaeus Plato has left us a fairly clear statement of his doctrine 
on the subject of physics. Here again the concept 01' imit4tJ.on occupies a 
conspiCUOUS place. 
Sone few scholars, A.E.Taylor among them, have contended that the doc-
trine propoeed in the 1'imaeus is not Platonic at all. Taylor believes that 
the views expressed in the dialogue are those of the Pythagorean Tirnaeus. He 
is willing to admit that perhaps Plato had accepted the doctrine as his own 
39 Copleston , p. 186. 
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pI"O'IiSlonaUy 88 "the 1'I\Ost ?1"om1sing 1.1n8 in .flfth centruy science and the one 
most directly connected with hi8 own derelopment8. M40 But as a doctrine, it 
belongs more pl'OpGrly to Timaeus than to Plato. 
F.M.Comfo1"d among others rejects this theory as an Itimprobability so 
great that overwhelming proof must be reQu tred • .,q,1 Corntord also points out 
that "all the ancient Platonilta trom Aristotle to Sitr4)lteio.s and all me(U"'~· 
..,41 and modern scholars to OW" own dE'iy have a.88UMed that this dialogue con-
ta: nil the l1'Jlture doctrlne of tta author:hl It 1s this majorlt)" opinion that 
the present writer prefers to accept. 
Thts sensible world, 11ke all objects ot becoming, nGCessarUy bp11e8 
80..,. kind of' 8: C8'lH, 'Which Plato :reters to a8 the d:tvine Craftsman or 
Dem1urge.43 The demlurge 1s responsIble tor the order in tm universe, but 
he did not croate !! nlbn.~ since the matter or prln:ev-a1 chao. was son:ehow 
o:t other supplied to hlm. The demlurge .took: over" what he found, nalf.1y, 
the tour primary quelit!ea out ot which !w m1ded the objects of this world 
a8 we know it in imitation of the ideal torms. Then he placed th .. objects 
in the receptacle or 8:18Oe which he also tound and -took over. tt44 
In thiS way, then, the ob3ect8 of otU" ordina17 a.1'UIe perception came 
into exiswnce. The)" ere the handiwork ot .. dIvine craf'tadJl who haa 
40A.E.Taylor, Ii. Conul18n\!£l !!! Platot2f TlmaS8 (Oxto1'd, 1928), p. 19. 
41rrallC18 .1'1. cor.Dtord, Plato's Comno1o,,-The 1'1maeu8 ot Plato trans-~!!!h! runnm~ ooprrt.Q (toJldOii, 1§ ... );i. '"Ix. -
4~Hl!eq.~, 28 oJ Jowtt, In, p. 716. 
44V?tq. 28c--4Od, Jowett, pp. 716-721. 
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fashioned them in imitation of the eternal realities themselves. Admittedly, 
these reproductions are only imperfect facsimiles not to be confused with the 
"real lt thing. Nevertheless, they copy reality, they mirror it because in 
some way they participate in it. Once again we find Plato having recourse to 
his fWldamental contention that this universe of ours is one step removed 
from the true and once again we find him leaning heavily upon the concept of 
imitation. 
I 
fut still other uses ofP.L)J.'1/f'tS could be cited in the dialogues ot 
Plato, if time and space allowed. Again and again Plato eq>loys t.he term. 
The essence of true statesmnahip, for example, implies "imitation." For the 
eraightened administrator of a city is the one Who realizes that his govem-
ment mst imitate good government itself' if he is to be worthy of the name 
statesman.45 In a sense he must be a philosopher far wiser and more prudent 
than his fellows. Otherwise, the state he rules wUl be like a ship "in 
which there is a captain who 1s taller and stronger than anyone else in the 
ship, but he is a little deat and 1s shortsighted, and his knowledge of navi-
gation is not much better. fJ46 The. sailors will eventually mutiny against 
such an incolllPetent captain and take charge themselves. Eut since they have 
no knowledge of the pilot's art, inevitable destruction awaits them. 
Enlightened government can only COmB from those who know what good gOV'ernnent 
/' is in itself. Elsewhere Plato remarks that laws whicl'i are the source of true 
government imitate the truths which they embody.47 
45Plato , :Statesma.n, 293e-297c, Jowett, III, pp. 509-513. 
46RepUbliC. 488a-4898, Jowett, II, pp. 347-348. 
47St",tesman 3OOb-c, Jowett, III, p. 516. 
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But there remains one use of the term "imitation" of which mention has 
not been made as yet and which is quite interesting in its implications. At 
the very beginning ot the dialogue which bears his na_, Critias remarkss 
"All that is said by any of us can only be imitation and representation.,,48 
When someone discusses matters divine and heavenly, he goes on, we are quite 
content if his words bear only a remote likeness to the realities which they 
imitate, because our knowledge of heavenly things is so meager. On the other 
hand, since all of us are quite wen acquainted with hu.n matters, we are 
more critical ot thOGe who atte~t to ft imitate" them in words. Hence Critias 
begs the kind indulgence of his hearers betore he begins his disquiSition. 
At the beginning of the Timaeus Socrates registers a simUar co~laint 
but for 8 ditterent reason. He yearns, so he remarks to his hearers, to 
describe in fitting language the ideal state which he has outlined in the 
R!public. If he could only describe the history of Buch a City, its wars, 
the courage of its warriors in battle, its nagnanimity towards other cities J 
fut he realizes that he is incapable of doing so, nor can the ordinary run of 
poets or the Sophists do so for him because "that which is beyond the range 
of a an's education he tinds hard to carry out in action, and still harder 
adequately to represent in language. 049 In other words, discourse is nothing 
more than an imitation of that which it describes. Such linguistic imita-
tions are quite difficult especially of those matters that are outside the 
scope of one' s educ~tion. 
48Critias 107b, Jowett, III, p. 789. 
49Timaeus, 19b-e, Jowett, III, pp. 707-706. 
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Taming now to t.he Cratll~s we discover Plato carI7ing the point one st.ep 
~, further. Here Socrat.es tells us t.hat. Ua name (OVOpoJ is a vocal imttat.ion of 
that which the imitat.or im1tateS."SO It is an imit.ation, howver, quite dif-
ferent from srtlsttc imit.ation because it. does not mimic the colors, torms, or 
sounds oi.' things but rather their natures or .. sences. Thus, tor exanple, the 
word -tablet! 1s an imitation ot thzt DDture "t4\bleness" found in certa.in four-
legged objects. A litt.le later he goes on to contend that the letters ot 
which words are comprised are themselves imitations. P, tor 1nstaB:lG, e.x-
presses mot.ion, cp,.p, (f, !, indicate shaking or shivering u 1n the words 
, , 
IIt.1XPov,(J"tl").40S, etc. r and T signify a state of rest whUe Aindlcate8 
SDDothnesS as in Arros.51 
Thus there is a real art to formulating words out. of syllables in sucb a 
way that the name produced adequately lll!itates or represents the nature of 
the object to be imitated. Not ..,ery man is capable ot such a task. ;'01" U he 
who by syllables aa.4 lott.ers imitates the nature or things, it he gives all 
that is appropriate wul produce a :~ood image, or in other vords, a ll&lneJ but 
it he subtracts or perhaps adds a little, he will make an bs.ge bu.t not a 
good 0118J whenCe I inter that some names are well and othen Ul macte. fI,2 
Socrates adds ODe more caution. Do not e.:xpect that worde wUl alwa,ya be 80 
formulated that they wUl 1mitate the object.s nature perfectl,._ For tldo you 
~~~tY1USt ll?3b, Jowett, III, p. 86. 
5lIbid• 426c-427d, Jowett, III, pp. 87-89. 
52~. 43ld, Jowett, III, p. 95. 
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not perceive that images are very far from having qualities which are the 
exact counterpart of the realities which they represent?,,53 on the other 
hand we must demand that words do imitate their objects as faithfully as pos-
sible. 
From uhat has been said thus far, one can appreCiate the wisdom of those 
words of Prof. Verdenius with which this chapter opened. It is certainly 
true that the concept of "imitation" is at the center of Plato's philosophy. 
Without it Plato's world is meaningless, his epistemology is unintelligible, 
his notion of physics empty. His concept of education, of statesmanship, 
rest upon it. For allot these imply tl'Ya essentially imi tat ive nature of this 
, , 
world of becoming (TQ( rt~VO)l£"vot. And finally his concept ot language has 
msaning only in so i'ar as one is willirC to concede that \10rds are basically 
imitations of natures and discourses are imitations of the things described. 
Is it aqy wonder, then, that when Plato approached the subject of art he 
was inclined to emphasize the imitative or representative aspects of that 
subject? \~ould we not be more surprised it he had emphasized aD¥thing else? 
One might even go so far as to say that Plato was metaphySically neceSSitated 
to adopt this approach to art. And yet as true as this last remark may be, 
it should not be misunderstood •. Plato did not inSist upon the e8sential~ 
imitative nature of art merely for the sake of logical consistency. He did 
so, as we shall see later, because he was convinced that the essence of art 
, 
could be analyzed in terms of'p.'P,,"LS and only in those terms, and good art 
differed from bad precisely as good imitation differed trom bad. But this 
point will be discussed later in its proper place. 
53r.;;::d. 432d, Jowett, III, pp. 96-91 .. 
CHAPTER II 
THE PLACE OF "IMItATION" IN PLA TO t S THEORY O~ ART 
Having considered the rnajor role that imitation played in Plato's phil-
osophy as a whole, we are in a much better' position to appreciate why the 
father of the Academy looked upon art as essentlally an imitation. It is to 
this point that we would like to turn our attention now. Before we do so, 
however, one prefatory remark seemS in place. In approaching this matter a 
certain amount of care must l:e exercised. It should be noted that Plato's 
position is not so si~le as it might seem at first encounter.. Anyone who is 
deceived by appearance will be inclined to scratch Plato's opinion off as a 
naive and childish over-simplifioation. Close study will reveal, however, 
that the Platonic theory of art is anything but naive or juvenile. And his 
contention that art is basically a representation or imitation of some aspect 
of reality, far from being frivolous, has a good deal ot objective validity. 
In the section that tollows the notion of art as an imitation will be 
subjected to rather close scrutiny. I:esides pointing out precisely what 
Plato meant b.1 the phrase, it will be necessary to indicate the difference 
between good imitation and bad imitation, Since therein lies the distinction 
between good and bad art in Plato.s opinion. Once we have pointed out the 
essence of true art we will be in a position to understand that Plato's con-
cept ot artistic imitation does not imply a slavish copying of sensible 




The reader must not look for a detailed analYSis of Platonic aesthetics 
here. The present wr iter does not pretend to be giving a thorough study of 
Plato's theory of art. As a matter of fact, this has been done already by 
several very cOIl'petent scholars.l Such an a~sis woald be beyond the scope 
of the present study. What we are concerned with is something more fundamen ... 
tal, namely, tho basic presupposition upon which Plato's aesthetics has been 
constructed. The belief that art is primarily imitative forms the foundation 
apon which Plato's theory of art stands. In so far as that notion is valid 
Plato's theory rests upon a sturdy foundation. In 80 far as that notion is 
false, Plato must be accused of having bull t upon sand. 
l1hat, then, does Plato mean when he speaks of art as a mimesi~? Does 
he mean, as some have hinted, that art is nothing more than a _f!.~u'Du~llo!!llY 
exact reproduction of its model? Is the artist to be looked upon as a mere 
copier whose task is to reduplicate the original with the utmost fidelity? 
It is certainly true that Plato frequently used the word mimeSis in precisely 
this sense. But he did so for the express purpose of denouncing it and ex-
posing it as the travesty of art that it is. If art is mere slavish copying 
and nothing more, Plato has no use for it whatever. 
l'ut it mimesis does not mea.n servile copyingt what does it mean? Per-
haps the most satisfying answer to this question is the one that Lana Cooper 
has proposed. He prefers to translate the term rr.iJ!l6sis <13 "representation." 
"'rhe poet, like the painter, the musician, the sculptor, has in mind a con-
ception which he will represent for his own and other's delight... The 
lJohn W.H.Atkins, L1terarz Cr~ticism In AntlquitYI A Sketch of its 
develoiment (Cambridge, 19345, I, pp. 33-7'0. - - -
up~rt C. Lodge, Plato's Theory.2! m (London, 1953) 
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conception which the artist 'imitates' is his 'object'; the pigments, or the 
stone, or the notes, in which he represents his object, we call the 'medium. r"2 
The artist, then, does not copy, he represents. The starting point of 
good art is the noble concept, the product of the artist's intuitive vision by 
which he penetrates through mere appearances to that higher ard. most sublime 
reality that is hidden within. Thanks to this lnsight he perceives universal 
realities and significances. He becomes aware of the universal esaences or 
forms ot things which the individual objects of this world mirror in an imper-
fect manner. 
It is this concept, the result of his intuitive vision, that the artist 
attempts to re-present with the aid of the medium of his art. Taken in this 
sense mimeSis does not imply slavish reproduction. Quite the contrary, it 
implies creative activity of the highest order. For the inspired artist ac'" 
complishes what nature has never attempted. "His distinctive work as an 
artist cons1sts in stamping the given material with the ~r.ss of the form 
which i8 universal.") What Putcher says of Aristotle on this point applies 
equally well for Plato. "There is an ideal form which is present in each 
individual phenomenon but imperfectly manifested. This form impresses itself 
as a sensuous appearance on the mind of the artist; he seeks to give it a more 
complete expreSSion, to bring to light the ideal which is only halt revealed 
in the world of reality. n4 
2Lanll Cooper, !h! Poetics ~ Aristotle: ll.! Meaning ~ Innuenc~ 
(New York, 1927), p. 18. 
3S.H. Butcher, Aristotle's !beor,: of Paetfi and inne Art with a cr1tical 




Such activity is surely creative, for "to seize the universal and to re-
produce it in simple and sensuous form is not to reflect a reality already 
familiar through sense perceptions, rather it is a rivalry of nature, a com-
pletion of her unfulfllled purposes, a oorrection of her failures. "5 
Verdenius, speaking of' Plato in partioular, remarksz 
It may be concluded that there are two points differentiating 
good art from mere trickery: its truthfulness and its lIOdesty. 
The artist should not content himself with a superficial glance 
at hIs objeot, but he must ., to penetrate its inner structure. 
His task is faithful interpretation, not slavish 1m1tation. 
Secondly, he Should have the honesty to admit the poorness of' 
his means and not try to overstep the limitations they lay upon 
him. His work should clearly show that its representation of 
reality. in spite of, or rather, on account of, its very faith-
fulness, is fundamentally different from reality itself. It 
should present itselt, not as a copy, but as a transposition gn 
a dU'ferent level and as obedient to the laws of this meditUll. 
More otten then not the Greek word mimesis is rendered into English as 
"imitation." If understood correctly "imitation" is not an inappropriate 
translation of the term. Unfortunately, however, "imitation" to many people 
is synonymous with "slavish copying." Mimesis, if it meant anythlng to Plato, 
did not mean "slavish copying." For this reason the English word "representa-
tion" is perhaps a more apt translation of the Greek, as Professor Cooper has 
suggested. 
That Plato was firmly convinced of art t s mimetic nature is clear enough 
trom. hls dialogues. .For example, at one point in the!:.!!! he describes the 
origin of art !nthe follOWing manner; "Art sprang up ••• and produced in play 
certain images and very partial imitations of the truth, having an affinity 
5Ibid., 154. 
everdeniuS, 21. 
r 28 to one another, such as music and painting create and their companion arts. 
And it there are other arts, these have a serious purpose and cooperate with 
nature, such, for example, as medicine and husbandr,y and gymnastiC."7 
Although at this particular point in the Laws Plato is summarizing the opin-
-
ions of "certain philosophersft with whom he does not wholly agree, it is 
nevertheless clear from what he says elsewhere that these remarks are an ex""" 
cellent summary of his own opinion in the matter. }i'or example, in the 
Sophist Plato remarks that art is 1m1tative and as such it is a form of crea-
tive activity. "Imitation is a kind of creation of images, how .... er, and not 
ot real things,n8 
When speaking ot the various Utine" arts more specifically Plato is at 
pains to point out their essentially mbetic naturejt An apt example is the 
painterts art. In the Reeub110 Plato remarks, nAnd the painter too is, aa 
I conceive, just another creator of appearances. ,,9 And just a few lines 
later he reiterates the same idea b.Y remarking that the art of painting is 
deSigned to.be an 'imitation not of things as they are but of things as they 
appear.10 Again in the Sophist, we hear the Stranger describing the painter 
as one who "makes resemblancos of real th1ngs.n He then goes on to add that 
at time$ the ~a1nter "can deceive the less intelligent sort of young Children, 
to whom he shows his pictures at a distance, into the belief that be has the 
7Pl.ato .. Laws 889b-d, Jowett, IV, p. 457. 
8Soe91st 26.)1" Jowett, III, p. 423. 
9R!2Ubl~q 5968, Jowett, II, p. 470. 
lO~. 598b .. Jowett, II, p. 472. 
absolute power of making whatever he likes ... 11 
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Like painting, music is an imitative art, odd as that fact may seem to 
Plato's modem day reader. At one point in the!:!!! the Athenian Stranger 
poses this question to Cleinias, the Cretan: tf1:o we not regard all music as 
representative and imitative?" Cleinias answer, "Certainly." The Stranger 
then continuesf "Everyone will admit that musical compositions are all imi-
tative and representative. WUl not poets and spectators and actors all 
agree in this?" O1e1nias' answer again 1s a decisive "Yes. ,,12 
In the Cratzlus we !ind much the same opinion expressed with regard to 
music. Socrates i8 trying to explain to his friends in What sense "words" 
are an imitation. By way of claritication he points out that music is not 
imitative in the same sense that words are imitative though both may be elas-
sified as vocal utterance.. "All objects, It he says, "have sound and figure, 
and many have color ••• the arts which have to do with these are music and 
draWing."13 In otper words the mUSician imitates sound and figure while the 
painter imitates the color. 
At another point in their discussion the Athenian Stranger speaking of 
music remarks: "I may observe, in paSSing, that in music there certainly are 
figures and there are melodies; and music is concerned with harmoqy and 
rhythm, so that you may speak of a melody or figure having good rhythm or 
good harmony... And let us say that the figures and melodies whiCh are 
llSoehist 2)4b, Jowett, III, p • .383. 
121:!!!, 668a""'O, Jowett, IV, p. 235. 
l3Cratllus 423b, Jowett, III, p. 86. 
r 
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expressive of virtue of soul or body, or of images of virtue, are without ex-
ception good, and those which are expressive of vice are the reverse of good.1itl4 
Or in other words music is more than an imitation of sounds and figures, it is 
imitative of mral qualities, of virtues. Good music can be distinguished 
from bad on the basis of the object imitated. If it is virtuous the imitation 
is good, if it 1s expressiV'8 of evil then it is essentially evil. 
lye of the modern age may find it somewhat difficult to conceive of music 
as L'n1tative. We are accustomed to think of it in a different way. , 
The emption it suggests, the message it conveys, corresponds but 
little'with a reality outSide itself, with a world of feeling 
alreadf known. We cannot test its trutb by its accordance with 
any original. It is capable of expressing general and elementary 
moods of feeling, which wUl be yariously interpreted by ditfer-
ent hearers. It cannot render the finer shades of extra-musical 
emotion with any degree of cert.a1nty and preCision. Its expres-
sive power, its capacity to reproduce independent realities, is 
weak in pr~rtion as the impression it produces is vivid and 
definite.15 
But Plato and Aristotle did not conceive of music in this manner. Fo~ 
them "music is the express image and reflexion of moral character.... Not 
only states of feeling but also strictly ethical qualities and disposition 
of mind are reproduced by musical imitation, and on the close correspondence 
between the copy and the original depends the inportance of music in the for-
mation of character. Music in reflecting character moulds and influences it~ 
DanCing too must be added to the list of mimetiC arts. Plato tells us i.a 
:J.4Laws 65, a-b, Jowett, rI, p. 220. 
l5s.H.Butcher, Aristotle's TheOr{ g! Poop" 2 }I'ine Art with a critical 




the !!!!! that dancing ia of two lcindat "One or nobler figures, imitating the 
honourable, t.he other of the more ignoble figure, imitating the mean. It The 
first or noble type can be redivided again. "Of' the serious, one kind is of 
those engaged in war and vehement action and is the exercise of a noble person 
and a manly heart. The other exhibits a temperate soul in the enjoyments of 
prosperity and modest pleasure. ttl? The Baechie dance, however, which imitates 
drunken men is t~ be outlawed altogether. 
Finally, there is poetry and drama both of which in the Platonic system 
are imitative arts. In the Republic Plato divides all poetry into tr.reo 
alasaesl the purely narrative in which the poet merely relates a story with-
out assuming the role of' any of the characters, the imitative, i.n which the 
poet impersonates the cnaracters of his story; and, finally, a type of poetl7' 
which i8 a union of both the narrative and imitative methods.18 
As an example of the purely narrati.ve Plato mentions the dithyramb, "a 
choral lyric origtilall,. connected with the worship ot Dionysus, sung by a 
'circular choir' probably of fif. singers. ,,19 Comedy and tragedy quite 
clearly are examples of poetry that is wholly imitative, while epie verae is 
a mixture of the imitative and the purely narrative. 
Other passages might be Cited, but thea. will suffice for our present 
purpoae. Th~ demonstrate clearly the essentially imitative nature of art 
according to ftlatots point of view. 
17taw., 814e-817e, Jowett, pp • .38.3-.386. 
18a!pub1~e .392d, Jowett, p. 2.38. 
19The Oxford COrrw!Alon to ClaSSical Literature, corrpiled and edited by 
Sir PauI'Harve,- {Oitord, i9sIT, p. i49. 
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That Plato adopted such a point of view is not in itself at all surpris-
Lng. The belief that "art imitates nature" was quite probably a prevalent one 
among the philosophers and artists of Plato's day. They doubtlessly accepted 
this point of view trom earlier thinkers "who devoid of Jlf'stical insight and 
interested primarUy in explaining the physics of the world, tended to look 
upon art in the plainest and most obvious manner possible. H20 What else did 
the sculptor, for example, do but mold a bronze or marble copy of an athlete 
or a charioteer? And what was the net result of his labors, but an imitative 
representation of the athlete copied? It was a simple and rather obvious 
answer and one that appealed to the unsophisticated philosophers of the Pre-
Socratic era. As we shall see, however, Plato did more than merely adopt 
their opinion. He altered it radically so as to make it tit in with his 
philoSOphy. 
This last remark brings us to a second reason why Plato looked upon im!-
tat10n as the essence or art, namely, that it fitted into his general phUo-
, 
sophical system quite neatly. It it had not, Plato would not have adopted it. 
lt~or Plato was not one to toll ow tradition blindly. He borrowed from his in-
tellectual forbears when he could do so in all honesty. But he did not hesi-
tate to disagree with them when he felt ot,liged to do so. In the matter of 
the arts, however, the currently popular opinion suited his philosophy well, 
and consequently he adopted 1t willingly. 
For after all, what is art, looked at metaphYSically, but an imitation of 
reality? Consider the painter. wbat does he do 'but copy the objects which 
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make themselves present to his senses? He paints a portrait, or a picture ot 
a bird or sone other sensibly perceived object. And yet if we analyse the 
nature oi' these phenomena more carefully, do we not find that they themselves 
are but teeble copies of an even higher and more noble real ity? And if, as 
was stated in the previous chapter, these Forms or Idea.s alone truly eXist, 
must it not be admitted that the artist's work is merely a copy of a copy of 
reality? It is two steps removed from the "real. t1 Just as God imitates in 
organizing the universe, the painter imitates in practising his art. Clearly, 
then, the popular notion ot the "imitative" nature of art was quite in con-
formity with Plato's metaphysics. 21 
It likewise fits in very logically with Plato's epistemology, as Rupert 
:» I 
Lodge has pointed out. ,fuile the philosopher has £Tf( ((('1/)/" the practical 
craftsman has at least So 50(. But the painter ot pictures and his tellow 
practionera of the "fine" arts have neither. They tend to confuse their works 
of art with reality and hence they have ~re Elj(dUl'o..22 
Since for Plato imitation was at the very heart of art it was only natural 
to expect that imitation would playa major role 'n his criticism of art. And 
in this regard Plato was thoroughly consistent. To his mind, good art was true 
artJ that is to say, art was truly good in so far as it imitated or copied the 
original as faithfully as possible. Art was defective or faulty in so tar as 
it fell short of this standard. This statement, however, should not be miscon-
strued. Plato did not equate good art with a. slavish copy ot the sensible 
2lR!publiC 596e .... 598d, Jowett, II, pp. 469-472. I ! 
~ , , "/ ,: ;' . .: " ~ . 
22Rupert C. Lodge, Plato's Theorz2! ~ (London, 1953), pp. f l7t"'176. 
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model, as we shall point out at length later on. Nevertheless, Plato very 
definitely made truth the ultimate criterion distinguishing noble from worth-
less art. The poet, the dramatist, the musical cOD{X)ser who is neglectful of 
truth is most assuredly a poor artist and, what is more, a menace to SOCiety 
and the state. 
Perhaps the modern art critic wlll be annoyed at What has been called 
Plato's excessive intellectualism. But before he discards Plato's point of 
view" it might be worth his whUe to give it serious considera,ion. For 
Plato's pOSition is by no means naive or 'indefensible. 
But why, the modern critic might logically ask, did Plato think it neces-
sary to link beauty and truth so closely? Is there no such thing, he might , 
argue, as poetiC fiction or dramatic exaggeration? Why should the artist feel 
bound to reproduce things as they are? Should he not, as Aristotle advised, 
imitate things as they could be? ~ore these questions can be answered. it 
wUl be necessary to make a few prelimine.ry remarks on Plato's general atti-
tude toward PHtry and art. 
The problem of distinguiShing between good and bad art was one of tre-
mendous importance to a man like Plato who was so much concerned with the 
question of mrality, education and political phllosophy. In Plato's da;y 
poetry and the arts were much cultivated and esteemed. 2) They had assumed a 
pOSition of prominence in Athenian life both in the education of the young 
and as a source of pleasure and delight for their elders. For this was the 
age when the heritage of Phidias and Myron, Sophocles and Euripides, Aristo-
phanes and Execias were delighting their fellow citizens with 'sona of the most 
F 
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magnificent art western civilization has ever known. Plato was not insensible 
to all this beauty. He too had been a poet of nerit in his earlier years and 
even the dialogues themselves are works of consummate artistry and skill dis-
playing a ~etic touch." 
But Plato, philosopher that he was, would not let himself be diverted in 
his search for truth by ~~at which was merely pleasing to the eye or the ear. 
Truth, philosophic wisdom, was his first love. .~nd therefore, poetry am art,~ 
like everything else would have to be marshalled before the supreme tribunal 
of truth. If it was found wanting in this respect it would have to be amended 
or censured. For after all, had not poetry been entrusted with the sacred 
task of training the young? Did not the arts wield unquestionable 1nflutlt::..o,,, 
in the molding of publio opinion and sentiment? Clearly, then, poetry and art 
ought to be subjected to a caretul analySiS by the philosopher lest it inflict 
incalculable evil upon the souls of _n and the state itself. As a matter of 
fact, it had alrea~ done much harm. 24 
But, one might object, if' this pOint of view is correct, if Plato's con-
tention that good art equals true art is gt"anted for the lIOlU!tnt, and if on the 
other hand, all art is a mere copy of a copy, two steps removed trom reality 
a.nd truth, are we not forced to conclude that art is bad? Log iea1ly should we 
not outlaw all artistic imitations? Did not Plato, at least implicitly, adVo-
cate such a course of action? 
The problem which this question raises is admittedly a comp1icat&1 one. 
However, the present writer l:e11eves that a satisfactory answer can be 
24Ibid• 
-
proposed. Following in the footsteps of such scholars as Ritter25 , 
CollingwoOd26, Atkins27 and others, he believes that what Plato inveighed 
against was faulty, untruthful imitation alone. It is his opinion that Plato 
distinguished between good and bad imitation and hence between good and bad 
art, retaining the former and rejecting the latter. As Robin George 
Collingwood. has remarked: "Most modern writers on aesthetics attribute to 
Plato the syllogism r imitation is bad) all art is imitative J therefore all 
art is bad. tHence, they go on, Plato "banishes art from his city.' I will 
not docunent my assertion. There is no need to pillory a few offenders for a 
crime that is almost unlversal. tt28 
The difference of opinion on this point is due in large pG.rt to an &~i?K'-
ent contradiction in the &!publip. 1It the beginning of book ten Plato remarks: 
nOf the many excellences which I perceive in the order of our State, there is 
none which upon refleotion pleases roo better than the rule about poetry, 
namely, our refusal to admit the i1llltative kind. ot poetry, for it certainly 
ought not to be received. n29 Plato here seemS to be referring to sone earlier 
part of the dialogue in which he has laid down a ruling abolishing imitative 
poetry from the state. Obviously, the reference is to that section ot Book 
III where he has discussed the educative value of poetry. And yet in Book III 
2SConstantln Ritter, The Essence .2!: Plato' s Philoso~hl, Trans. by Adam 
Alles (New York, 1933), p.~6. 
t\SRobin G. Collingwood, !!!! Pr1nc!pl~s .2!~, (Oxford, 1950), p. 46. 
27 Atkins, p. 52. 
28Col11ngwood, p. 46. 
29ReeubliO 595&, Jowett, II, p. 468. 
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we fUld that Plato, far from outlawing all poetr.y, distinguishes various kinds 
of imitation, praising aOMe while rejecting others. 1"or instance, Plato 
praises the tlrougher and se-,rerer poet or storyteller who will imitate the style 
of the virtuous only, and will follow those models which we prescribed at first 
when we beean the education of our soldier. tt30 Clearly such poetry i;q;>lios 
im tation and he exp11e itly welcomes it tnto his state. IJatar Glaucon remarks, 
"Yes J I quite agree with you in thinking that our youth should be trained in 
music. ,,31 Now if mUSic (poetry) is 1mltatt\fe and if Pla.to 1s ~~1.ll1ng to re-
celve it into hiS model state for its educative value, is he not guilty of an 
inconsistency when later on he tells us all imitative poetry has been 
abolished? 
Although the inconsistency poses a problem it is not 8.8 inexplicable as it 
ndght appear. This writer believes that a careful scrutiny of the text itselt 
will reveal Plato's co:}sistent, if somawhat hidden logic. First of all, let us 
consider what Plato has to say in '~ook III about imitation. 
The reader will recall that in Book TIl Plato distinguishes three kinds of 
poetry; the pure narrative" the purely imitative" and the mixture of these two. 
The question t.hen arises: Can the guardians imitate?' A si~le "yes" or "no" 
answer is i.Ir{)ossible. Certainly, iw.1tatlng can be harmful, Plato remarks. For 
it destroys single-mindedness.32 and tends to make us like the people we imitate 
Imitation is apt to become reality. And it we imitate inappropriate qualities 
.'3<1:bid. 398 b-c" Jowett, n, p. 24,. 
3lIbid. 402 a, Jowett, II, p. 2,0. 
32Ibid. 394.-39'a, Jowett, II, p. 241. 
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we are liable to 1evelop those 'nappropriate qualities in ourselves. For "did 
you never observe how imitations beginning in youth and continuing far into 
life, at length grow into habits and become a second nature, affecting body, 
voice, and ~tnd?ft33 
Surely the guardians must be forbidden to mimic depraved, ambitious men, 
or quarrelsome, love-sick, emotionall:! distraught t1iomen. Likell1ise cowards, 
drunvards, or mad;'len ought not be imitateel. On the other hand, Plato encour-
ages the imitation of "those characters which are suitable to their profession-
the courageous, temperate, holy, free, and the like. n34 A ~ood and just man 
wUl be happy to "play the part of the good man when he is acting firmly and 
. 
wisely. nut when he comes to a character 'tIhich is unworthy of him ••• he will 
assume his likeness, if at all, for a moment only when he 13 performing some 
---
:yood action • .,35 The point to be noted here is a crucial one. Plato has dis-
tinguished two kinds of imlt8tion, one of which he has accepted as "good." 
With this dist1nction in mind we are in a better position to evaluate 
Plato's threefold division of poetry of which we spoke before. Pure narrativEI 
now becolOOs the style of the virtuous man. The imitative element is minimal 
but, and this is of extreme importance, it is not arsent altogethor, since the 
good ;nan "wUl adopt a mode of narration that is imitative and narrative, but 
there will be little of the former. ft36 Purely imitative poetry, the second 
kind, is banished altogether as is the third or "mixedfl form of poetry. 
33Ibld. 395d, Jowett, p. 242. 
34Ib1d. 395c, Jowett, p. 242. 




So ~lch for Book III. Can it be shown that what Plato has to say in Book 
, 
X harmonizes with our analysis of Book III? In the ver.y first sentence of Book 
X Plato reminds his reader that lye have abolished imitative art from the 
State.;! Is this contradictory'? No, not in the least. The conclusion reached 
in Book III was that poetlj of' the second and third types, the wholly imita-
tive and the partially imitative were to be abolished. Here Plato merely re-
iterates that condemnation. Of the 'non-imitative' poetry, in which some irni .. 
ta'~i()n 10 311oweci, Plato says nothing :t.ere. Hence the opening lines of Book I 
merel,y suntnarize. the conclusions reached in Book III and in no way contradict 
them. 
Later on in Book X, however, Plato has much more to say about the meta ... 
physics of artistic imitation. At first glance these statements seem to be 
even more irreconcilable with the sentiments expressed in Book III~ But fur-
ther analysis will reveal, as Professor Tate has demonstrated so ably, that 
Plato's metaphysical analysis of art is thoroughly consistent with what he has 
said heretofore. 37 
Plato's metaphysical interpret.3tion of art as sketched in Book X is 
briefiy this. As was noted elsewhere, Plato divides reality into three levels; 
the world of subsistent ideas, which alone are really real) the world of 
everyday sense perception, which is not being but only beComing, not real but 
only phenomenal; finally we have the a.rtist '8 world of images or copies. Now 
it we cannot call the sensed world real because it only copies reality I what 
are we going to say about the world of the artist who copies that 
37 J. Tate, tllmitation in Plato's Republic I Ii Cla.ssical ~\larter!l1 XIII 
(New York, 1928), pp. 16-23 
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copy of reality? 
Plato felt compelled to the-conclusion that the sculptor's statue, the 
poet's verses are two steps removed from real being, real truth, and real 
beauty. 38 Being a mere copy 01' a copy the p'iinterts picture is too far removed 
from truth and beauty to be of value. The artisan t s knowledge is unphilosophic 
because he knows only appearances and imitates these in his work. The essen-
tial untrutht'ulness of his work makes it wholly unacceptable to Plato, regard-
less of whatever charm it may have. As J. Tate has remarked. "Similarly, it 
such a poet represents-to the satisfaction of those as ignorant a8 himselt-a 
virtuous man or one gifted with any quality or art, it must not be thought. (a8 
most men think) that he hidel! knows the truth about virtue and whatever arts 
he happens to represent.. n39 
It a man possessed genuine knowledge, Plato argues, if he really knew what 
virtue is in itself, wbat enlightened statesmanship or true education are J he 
would not wast.e his time in image-making rut would interest himself in real!-
ties. He would strive to become an enlighten."d statesman like Lycurgus, a 
elti~er general, or an inventor like Thales. Or it' he could do none of' these 
at least he would iDpart his wisdom to others in his deSire to i~rove mankind. 
In short "the real artiSt •• would be interested in realities and not imitatiOns; 
and would desire ,to leave as memorials of h1.mSelf works ma~ and fair J and, 
instead of being the author 01' encomiums, he would prefer to be t he theme of 
them.,,40 wt the cruel truth ot the matter is, Plato concludes, that Homer, 
38RepubliC 597a, Jowett, II, p. 470. 
391'ate, flImitation in Republic ll , p. 20. 
4OnopubliC 599b, Jowett, Ir, p. 473. 
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Hesiod and the other poets content themselves with shadow making, thus showing 
their lack of any real knowledge. 
Are we, then, to conclude that all poetiC and artistiC imitation is out-
lawed? Must we reject the conclusions reached in Book III? Apparently not, 
for Plato himself remarks that "l:\Yms to the gods and praises of famous men 
are the only poetry which ought to be admitted into our state. ,,41 lrlhat Plato 
leaves to be understood here is that the poet need not necessarily imitate the 
objects of his sense world. 'l'he painter or the poet can produce a direct copy 
of the divine paradigms42 unlike tbe ignorant artist who merely holds up a 
mirror to nature. Such art will partake 01' philosophiC wisdom, it will be 
founded on 8 first-hand knowledge of the ureal." Just as the enlightened 
ruler of the state mu.st be a man whose education bas led him to a contempla-
tion of the divine paradigms, so the enlightened artist oi' the state mUlft be a 
an 01' the same philosophieal training. His works will be highly acceptable 
in the state since they are not nearly so devoid of truth and beaut) as those 
of the ordinary run of artisans. J. iate has sumnarized this point well: 
The distinction between the good and bad senses of imitation is, 
broadly speaking, a distinction between two kinds of artist J the 
ignorant on the one hand and the enlightened on the other. liere 
we have the key to understanding Plato's attitude towards poetry 
and art in general. 
We have seen Plato using an analoey between imitative poetry 
and ilftitative painting, in order to lllustrate the remoteness of 
4l!bid. 607a. Jowett, II, p. 483. 
42Ibid• 5OOc, Jowett, II, p. 361. "His eye is ever directed towards 
things fixed and immutable, which he sees neither injuring nor injured by one 
another, but all in order moving according to reason,; these he imitates J and 
to these he wUI, as far as he can, conform himself." 
r 
imitative art frOm truth. But there is an art whioh is not imita-
tive in this sense, though imitative in4another sense; an art whioh does not merely copy external reality. tt 3 
42 
The conolusion to be drawn, then, from Book X of the Republic is that 
there are two kinds of imitation, the good and the tad. The former has the 
eternal Ideas as its model, the latter, the world of beooming. Thus Plato's 
position is thoroughly conSistent and the distinction which he made earlier 
in the Republic still stands. 
But the question might be raised, does Plato remain faithful to this dis-
tinction in the other dialogues? Can passages be cited in other Platonic 
works in which Plato distinguishes between good and bad imitation? The answer 
is a very definite "yesJI For exa.1l1Ple, in the SYl!f0sium Plato describes poets 
as "tho •• souls which are pregnant with wisdom and virtu. in general •• Who, 
when he thinks of Homer and Resiod and other great poets, would not rather 
have the ir children than ordinary human ones? Who would not emulate them in 
the creation of children such as theirs, which have preserved their memory and 
given them everlasting glory?lt44 Could more laudatory expression of the poet's 
worth be found anywhere?" But why i8 this? WIv should Plato who usually 
abuses the poets, become so enthusiastic in their praise all of the sudden? 
The answer is clear from the remarks that tollow. Plato here is referring to 
the artistic imitator of the Ideas themselves, especially ideal beauty. The 
true poet is he who has learned to love "abstract beauty," not this or that 
beaut1.tul thing. Such an intellectual perception demands much contemplative 
43Tate, "Imitation in the ~public." p. 21. 
44E1.l1!E08ium 209a-d, Jowett, I, p. 541. 
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stud7. Only by degr'ee. does one rise trom the contemplation of beautiful ob-
jects to the realization that beauty is one. 'ew attain that highest summit 
from which beauty itself "absolute, separate, and everlasting, without diminu-
tion or inerease or any change, can be viewed. ,,45 fut the genuine poet is he 
who has climbed to that sUlumit and with the eyes of his soul has gazed upon 
"divine beauty, pure and clear and unalloyed, not infected with the pollutions 
of the flesh and all the colors and vanities of mortal l1te.~ Such an 
artist, then, will be able to '''[ring forth, not images of beauty but realities 
for he has hold not of an image but of 8 reality.tt47 
Only one conclusion can be drawn from remarks such as these.. Plato care-
tully distinguishes between poor art which imitates the sensible world and 
truly noble art for which ideal beauty and the subsistent essences serve as 
modelS. As Ritter has put it. 
In a more careful descrJption we are told that What 18 patterned 
after an eternal prototype is always beautiful) whereas that which 
the human artisan has patterned after the prototype of sensible 
things is ugly. From this I conclude that the true artist always 
produces in accordance with an idea., liut never in accordance with 
images. One may logically divide the concept of imitation in vari-
ous ways; but the diviSion Which ae8thetics alone considers holds 
to the disGgnction whether an idea is imitated immediately or 
media tel1' .. 
In the Phraedrus we find much the same sentiment expressed. Socrates 
remarks. "To Homer and other writers of poems.. to Solon and others who have 
45Ibid. 211b, Jowett, p. 543. 
46nid. ale, Jowett, p. 543. 
47I bid. 2128, Jowett, p. 543. 
48Ritter, p. )66. 
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compQSed writings in the torm of political discourses which they would term 
laws- to all of them we S8.y that if their compositions are based on knowledge 
of the truth and they can defend or prove th .. ,... then they are to be called, 
not only poets. orators. legislators, but are worthy of a higher na_, befit-
ting the serious pursuit of the11" life... Philosopher is their modest and be-
fitting title. n49 
In short, Plato's poet strives to transcend the material world; in his 
poor way he fltries to evocate something of that higher realm ot being... In 
true art likeness does not refer to commonplace reality, but to ideal Be_uty. tt~ 
The "Athenian" Who acts as the interlocutor in the ~ expresses this 
very same opinion when speaking of music. IlWe must assert," he tells ua, 
"That imitation is not to be judged of by pleasures and false opinion, but ••• 
by the standard of truth. ••• And if there be any music of which pleasure is 
the criterion, such music is not to be sought out or deell8d to have aIV real 
excellence but only that other kind of music which is an imitation of the 
good. ,,51 
From all this evidence the inevitatJ.e conclusion seems to be that Plato 
was by no means an enelfG" of all artistic imitation. Despite the apparent diS-
crepancy in the R!2ublic, Plato's thought on the subject is quite ... consistent. 
Some artists imitate mere appearances. hence their work is untruthful, ugly, 
and dangerous to the genera.l well-te1ng of the State. On the other hand, some 
49Phraedrus, 278 c, Jowett, III, p. 188. 
50v erdenius, p. 18. 
51L811s 661e-668&, Jowett, IV, p. 234-235. 
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few artists, possessing genuine tnLar"JA"I and not mere opinion, enploy reality 
itself as their m:>del and create something that is beautU'ul and uplifting be-
cause it is essentially truthful. Perhaps one rr~y be inclined to object to 
Plato's insistence that beauty and truth are one. This objection will be con-
sidered in its proper place. But the point to be noted here is that Plato did 
alte a distinction between gOOd and bad art. 
There is no questioning the .t'act that Plato's approach to art is unpopular 
among modern critics.52 AS influential as the Platonic concept of artistic 
imitation was in Hellenistic and Roman times and in the mod.m .ra up untU the 
Jlid .... ighteenth century, it has fallen into disrepute in our times. Some modern 
scholars have condemned the whole concept calling it, as otto Apelt did, ". 
systematic violation of art depriving it ot all its charm • .,5) Even such crit-
ics as Maritain, Cory, Collingwood and others enploy the notion with caution 
and only after drawing s8V'eral very careful distinctions.54 
Some ot these objections at least, are based on a misunderstanding ot 
precisely what Plato meant men he spoke of the mimetic character of art. 
Much of the criticism is based on the false assumption that imitating implies 
a slavish copying. It this is what one understands qy imitation then it is 
not difficult to appreciate vhy one rejects it. But happily neither Plato nor 
Aristotle held such an opinion. Imitation tor them had a ric!1er, fuller sig ... 
n1ticance. When one realizes this tact, many ot the objections levelled at 
52McKeon, "Concept of Imitation in Antiquity, tt p. 147. 
530tto Apelt, Platonlsche Aufsatze (Leipsig-Ferlin, 1912) pp. 68-7°, 
Cited in Verdeniu8, pp. 1-~. 
$4Jacques Maritain, ill and ScholastiCism, p. 64. 
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their theory vanish into thin air. That Plato did not advocate slavish realism 
can be shown from his own words. "So let US turn to his own words, with an 
openro1nd and attending to their qualifications and limitations. ,,55 
1s Professor Verdenlus has pointed out very well, the Platonic notion of 
imitation contains two elements, the realistic and the idealistic. Both mwst 
be present in a truly good piece of art. In Plato's theory a true reconcilia-
tion at idealism and realism takes place.56 
A work of art, s.s Plato analyzed it, was nothing rore than a concrete, 
sensible representation of an idea. Plato insisted that the artist imitates 
or represents objects which are sensibly discemihle. The artist depicts men 
in actton, legislators, warriors, sages, philosophers. Further, he strives to 
make us conscious of their virtuous qualities, their sagacity, their prudence, 
their sense of proportion and moderation, their te~erence, their fortitude, 
their courage. He represents gods, or animals, or inanimate objects in so far 
as these influence the ordinary course of human life. The sensibly recogniz-
able element is always present. Pure abstractionism or formalism were wholly 
foreign to Plato's concept of art. And that 1s why Plato conceived art as an 
1m1tation of What is or at least of what could be. For him a good play cen-
tered around human characters, a praiseworthy statue was of a man recognbable 
as a man, a painting was a visible manifestation of a visibly discernible ob-
je4!t. And in every case the imitation was made in some sensible medium, mar-
ble, colors, or words. Art was all of this for Plato, but it was something 
roore bes ides. 
55verdenius, p. J. 
56Ibid., p. 19. 
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]for really fine and noble art "does not, lapse into flat realism," because 
it strives to transcend the material world. tl57 As was pointed out earlier the 
inspired artlst attenpts to imitate the essences ot' things. He soars above 
this world ot becoming to the realm of the "real." And although he is com-
pelled to employ sensible media nevertheless he tries to represent the hidden 
meaning and slgn1t'icance of what he imitates. Thus he copies what he sees with 
the eyes of the soul. He imitates the truly just man, the truly wise man, the 
truly tOJlt)erate man. He imitates not merely some beaut1t'ul object, but rather 
beauty itself. 
Thus a fine pa inting has its "real" aspect. It is a v is ible, sens ible 
representation ot' objects familiar to all of us. Considered from this aspect, 
it is of interior value because it 1s a shadow, a mirror held up to nature.58 
But it likewise has its ideal aspect in so far as it captures and mimics the 
essence of the object imitated.. Approached from this point of view it is a 
noble, upl1t't1ng thing of beauty that wul remain a joy forerter. 
J.s Prof. Verdeniu8 has demonstrated brUliantly, this Platonic doctrine 
is "well illustrated by the spirit of Greek art ... 59 The Greek artist, 
Verdeniua point.,out, a1lled at 1m1tating "nature," that is, what be saw, and 
heard, and felt. "But he did not stick to its casual aspects" He rather 
tried to detect its deeper IOOanings. He was well aware of the fact that the 
essential n~ture of things is not identical with their visual appearance, but 
57 Ibid., p. 19. 
58aepublic 5968, Jowett, p. 469. 
59verdenius, p. 19. 
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that it must still be represented in natur~l forms. He also knew that suggest-
ing a deeper meaning is not to be achieved through deforming nature but through 
clar ifying its fundamental structure. ttOO 
'rhe art of Plato's time gave evidence of a growing inclination toward 
"realiSm." Plato himself l'itterly denounced slavish copying of a.ppearances. 
Such worthless imitation is deceitful and essentially untruthful. 
frOm these considerations it becomes clear that Plato did not advocate a 
Dll8re slavish copying of nature. He l:elieved that the "raall! element could, in 
fact should, be present. Iut he also maintained that the ideal element waS as 
equally indispensible. As Atkins has remarked! "Alive as he (Plato) was to 
an unseen reality existing behind the objects of sense, he conceived of an 
imitation of the ideal. forms of that unseen world, ideas of justice, beauty, 
and truth, which were to be embodied in human character. ,~nd it is this kind 
of 'imitationt that he associates with poetry in its highest form. tt61 
Poetry, indeed all arts in their highest form consist essentially in the 
representation of an intuition. The artist, with an insight akin to that of 
the philosopher, comes to perceive universal realities and significances. 
,..~ 
The permanent ond uninrsal characteristics oi' hunan 1 Ue and thought reveal 
themselves to him. The artist then endeavors to represent these eternal, 
universal realities in the sensible medium of his art. Hence what he repre-
sents is Y1t"t the individual, particular object - nan, let US say but rather 
he re-presents for us his intuitive vision into human nature 1tself. As 
Lodge has remarked: "If the artist is one of the great ones J his work wlll 
60Ibid• p. 20. 
-
61Atklns, p. ,2. 
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express" not :nerely a particular flash of inspiration, significant only for his 
own time and place; but an inspiration of universal human significance. Jt62 
Or as Butcher puts it: "Imitative art in its highest form, namely poetry, 
is an expression of the universal element in human life •• 6,3 
It is precisely this universal aspect that aCcOWlts tor the enduring repu-
tatton and fa.1le Of all great art. For universal forms" the essences of things, 
remain Wlaltered although tbne may play havoc with the accidentals. The artist 
whose poetic inSight enables him to perceive the universal aspect and whose 
genius enables him to represent it in the medium of his art will live forever 
in the memory 01' men. For his masterpiece will possess that universal appeal 
which ti~e cannot destroy. 
The artistts activity, considered in this ll,ght, is truly creative. H>r 
he very definitely makes something (poiema). Furthormore, that which he makes 
has heretofore never existed. His endeavor has been to re ... pntoont the Idea, 
the immutable, eternal, universal form or essence in a sensible medium. Such 
activity as this is not sterile, uninspired mimicr,y. For, to quote Butcher's 
apt words again: ttTo seize the universal, and to reproduce it in Simple and 
sensuous form is not t.o rellect a reality already fa.~lUiar through sense per-
eeptlonsJ rather it is a rivalry of na.ture, a completion of oor un!ulfilled 
purposes, a correction of her failures.,,64 
The woroks of nature reflect dimly and imperfectly those universal higher 
truths. The artist's product also reflects, manifests, or represents these 
62tOdge, p. 139. 
63Ptltcher, p. 150. 
64Ibid., p. 154. 
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same universal realities. The difference consists in this, the artist works 
with more conscious intellectual intent. Consequently, his product is a more 
accurate manifestation of the universal. "He seeks to give it (the form) a 
more complete expression, to bring to light the ideal which is only half re-
vealed in the world of reality.-65 
Were this fact more adequately understood, many MOdern critics would take 
a !flOre sympathetic stand with regard to Plato·s theory. Nor would they shy 
~ from such expressions as "representative art" or "artistic imitation." 
Collingwood i8 a good e:xa.nple in pOint. .At one place in his book he remarksl 
-The doctrine that all art is representati~e is a doctrine commonly attributed 
to Plato and Aristotle." Then in a very cryptic footnote he informs his 
reader that the concept is "falsely attributed" to them. 66 What bothers Mr. 
Collingwood is that "representative art" will be mistaken for "slavish copying 
ot nature. If Indeed, if the two expressions are synonymous then Collingwood is 
correct in maintaining that the former is falsely attributed to Plato and 
Aristotle. But why should they be looked upon as s,ynonymous? Instead of aban-
doning the term which both Plato and Aristotle chose to use, would we not do 
just as well to find out precisely what Plato and Aristotle meant by it? 
, 
Thus far in this resume of PlatoniC,M()I,crtS we have pOinted out, first of 
all, that Plato considered all the so-called "fine arts" imitative, even music 
and dancing. Secondly, we noted that Some artistic imitations are good, some 
bad, depending on how closely they represent the subsistent Ideas. Thirdly, it 
65,;bid., p. 15.3. 
66CollingWOOd, p. 43. 
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was pOinted out that genuinely good imitations contained both a realistio and 
an idealistic element, thus making it quite clear that Plato did not propose 
flat realism as the artist's supreme goal. Only one thing remains, namely, to 
say sometbing about the imitator or the artist himself. 
According to Plato two virtues should characterize the "maker of images, If 
truthfulness and roodesty. Tbe ·Philosopher-artlst~ must surely be a lover of 
truth. F'or he is one of those blessed souls who has been pe nai t ted to emerge 
from the cave of images and shadows and has been granted the inestimable privi-
lege of conte~lating reality itself. .lI.'ver afterwards, although he is com-
pelled to dwell among the sbadows and lllusory appearances of the cave for the 
sake of his less fortunate tellow mortals, he will be haunted by the over-
whelming realization of what truth, beauty, and goodness are in themselves. 
In all his work he will 1m.itate those higher realities, despite the fact that 
he must enploy sensible material ddia. 67 
Secondly, the true artist is modest enough to admit that he is only a 
maker of imitations and that imitations are no more than a second best. There 
is a great danger that he might mistake resemblance for identity. Many a poet 
has erred in this way. i'or the artist who so intensely absorbs himself in his 
subject matter that "his soul supposes herself to be among the scenes he is 
describing';66 is likely to forget the cleavage which separates him from realitj' 
and to claim a greater independence for his images than they deserve. And so 
the ideal artist, although he labors assiduously at his work, attaches little 
67RepubliC $OOc, Jowett. II. p • .)61. 
68 ~ 535 b-c, Jowett, I, p. 109. 
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value to it. As a matter of tact he admits ttthe def1ciencies of his knowledge 
and hi.s means and gives his ?roduots tor wbt'lt they arel images which, by in-
terpreting the re~l nature ot" their ot:jects, try to suggest aorrBt.hing 0.1' the 
world of ~1ng, 1::JUt Which never belie their irrational orl.:;in and tho limIta-
tions of the1r mediurn.,,69 
Obl1oUBly, such a degree of humility is quite rare and that is precisely 
wby Plato forwarns US against the zragic spell whioh the art.lst creates. ",Ie 
!'fluet be forever on our guard lest the tantalif&l11g char:, 01' 1m1tation cwerwhelro 
u.s ar.d lead us tar from the path of truth and virtue. Jtor art "seems to be a 
cor:t'Upt1on of the rdnd of all those who do not possess as an antidote a know-
ledle of its real nature. 1I 7;) 
69verdenll1., p_ 23. 
7i1s!bli.g S9Sb, Jowett, p_ 468. 
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CHAPTER III 
AN hVALUATION OJf PLATO'S THliljRY AND ITS INFLUENCE 
As was mentioned earlier, modern critics ot art have been inclined t9 re-
ject the Platonic-Aristotelian notion of "imitation. ft This attitude of mind is 
due, at least in some cases, to an inperfect understanding of what Plato and 
Aristotle meant. In the previous chapter we have endeavored to analyze Plato's 
position in the hope that a full.er knowledge 01' his doctrine might lead to a 
greater esteem of its ~rits. To be sure, neither Plato nor Aristotle said all 
that can be said on the subject 0.1' art, and this is particularly true of Plato. 
This writer is not contending that Plato's theory should be accepted bliridly as 
the "last word" in artistic analysis. Nor does he mean to infer that all sub-
sequent philosophies of art a.re so much wasted effort. Both the ancient and 
modern worlds can boast of outstanding thinkers whose penetrating inSights 
have enriched the western world's knowledge of art's purpose and nature. None 
of these contributions can te disregarded. Nevertheless, while admirine; and 
accepting wbat is truly of value in the unev", one need not abandon the "old." 
The contention of this writer is that Plato (and with him Aristotle) understood 
the nature of art profoundly. Their observations on art are not without rele-
vance even today. One need not, perhaps should not, accept all of Plato's con-
clusionS. But he ought to s1ft the wheat from the cWf and take the former 
for what it 18 worth. 
Numerous objections have been levelled against the PlatoniC theory of 
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artist imitation, some quite justified, others less justified. Now that we 
have seen precisely what Plato's doctrine is in this matter we are in a posi-
tion to evaluate Some of the objections. 
In his book, ~ !m2 Realitl, F.O. Nolte takes exception to what he calls 
"Plato's naive understanding of artts purpose.-l Plato's notion, Nolte main-
tains, that the artist's work is a copy 01' a copy two steps removed from real-
ity, is based on the false supposition that the purpose of a work of art is 
the same as that of its visible model. In other words, the painting of a bed 
should serve the same purpose as a ted. "Only under this assuJq)tion could it 
pertinently be called a reproduction or a copy." Naturally J Mr. Nolte rebels 
at such a concept of art and very rightly so. For as he remarks later. "It 
is not permissible to condemn a painting as an inferior substitute for a bedJ 
for, it was never intedded to serve as such. ft2 
Underlying this obdection there seems to be a basic misconception of 
Plato 18 doctrine. If one studies t.he Platonic dialogues carefully, and does 
not restrict himself to Book X of t.he !!!2ubliC, he wUl be forced to the con-
clusion that we reached in the preceding chapter. As was pointed Plato advo-
cated realism, but a realism that imitated the ideal as well as the sensibly 
"real." He did not advocate slavish copying. He believed that the true 
artist portrayed not merely the appearances J but the inner meaning and signifi-
cance, the essences ot things. Plato certainly did not look upon art as a 
substitute for rea11t;y. In fact, he explicitly condemns those patrons of the 
IF.O.No1te, Art and Reality (Lancaster, 1942), pp. 107,108,11). Cited 




beaux arts who take artistic imitations as real • 
................... -
Other critics of art, on the other hand, have objected to the Platonic 
theory on the grounds that it is too coldly intellectual. Plato, they say, 
contused beauty and truth and as a result neglected the emot ional aspects of 
artistic appreciation. There is certainly a v,ood deal of truth in this ob-
jection. Plato distrusted the emotions 'becaUSE' he looked upon t hem as an un-
ruly force in rran constaJlUy warring againSt sovereign reason~.3 A mants vir-
tue and character depended largely on his ability to dominate his emotions in 
a rational manner, and this was not easily done. ,F'or the enx>tions are like 
high-spirited steeds constantly rebelling against all forms of restraint. 
Since art pandered the emotions by calling them into play-, Plato was quite 
distrustful of the arts. Because of this same distrust of the emotions Plato 
was unwilling to grant that art's principal aim 1s to give pleasure, since 
pleasure implies aro11Sing the feelings and emotions, Speaking of muSic Plato 
remarks: "Wben anyone says that msio is to be judged ot by pleasure, his 
doctrine cannot be admitted ••• Those who seek for the best kind of song a.rd 
music ought not seek what is pleasant, but for that which is tr11e.-4 As 
Verdenius has remarked: "It must be admitted that Plato did too little j11S-
tice to the specifiC function of aesthetical feeling and emotion." Hence 
there is some truth in the accusation that Plato's approach to art is too 
intellectual. 
on the other hand, it mst also be said that Plato "did not corrpletely 
l}1epubliC 591 awe, Jowett, n, pp. 466-467. 
4x.aws 668 a-b, Jowett, II, pp. 235. 
ignore the em:>tions. tl5 For example, he recognized the ~ortance of "true 56 
pleasures in the appreciation of art." "True pleaesures are those which are 
given by beauty of color and form, and most of' those which arise from smells; 
those of sound, and in general those of which the want is painless and uncon-
scious, and of which the fruition is palpable to sense and pleasant and unal-
loyed with pain. tt6 
What is more, Plato Was the first to point out the em:>tional effect proper 
to tragedy. In the Republic he tells us how pity and fear are aroused b,y the 
tragic plays.7 He also attempted to explain why a tragic spectacle full of' 
sorrow and pathos can give pleasure to the audience. lJhen one is moved by a 
tragedy, Plato tells us, he can be said to smile through his tears. His eno-
t10n8, painful in themselves, have been aroused.. He feels anger, or fear, or 
envy, or pity in his soul. Yet for some reason or other these eJ!X)tions afford 
him considerable pleasure. "Need I remind you," he remarks, II of th e anger 
which stirs a wise man to violence and is sweeter than honey and the honey-
comb?1t8 
Equally valuable are Plato's ot8ervations with regard to the emotional. 
effects of' comedy. What causes our laughter, Plato tells us, i8 another's 
ftharmless self-conceit. ,,9 flThe pleasure of the ludicrous springs from the 
SverdeniuS, p. 29. 
6Philebus 5lb, Jowe'tt, III, p. 610. 
7Reeul:i1.iC 605d and 387 b-d, Jowett, II, p. 481 and 231. 
8PhUetwJ 47e, Jowett, nI, p. 606. 
9Ib1d. 48-49, Jowett, W. 606-609. 
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s1ght of another'lS misfortune, the ndsfortWle, however, being a kind of self-
ignorance that is powerless to inflict hurt •• Plato anticipates, but goes 
deeper than, Hobbes, whose well known 'Words are worth recalling: 'The passion 
of laughter is nothing else but a sudden glory, arlsll1g from a sudden concep-
tion of sone endnence in ourselves, by cOJll)ar1son of the infirmity of others 
or with our own tormerly. ,,10 Clearly, then, Plato was not altogether oblivi-
ous of the arnot lonal aspect ot art. 
Still some have attacked Plato's whole concept of art as an imitation b.Y 
ma1ntaining that art is essentially a creative activity. Hence self-expression 
not inl1tation, is at the center of artistic endeavor. A.C.Bradley, in a series 
of lectures at O~ord, developed this position at some length. He states; 
"Poetry may hwe also an ulterior value as a means to culture or religion be-
cause it conveys instruction or softens passions ••• But its ulterior worth 
neither is nor can directly determine its poetic worth as a satisfying ina gin-
at1ve experience) and thiS is to be judged entirely from within ... For its 
nature is to be not a part, nor yet a copy, of the real world, but to be a 
world by itseU', independent, conplete, autonolOOusJ and to possess it fully 
you must conform to its laws, and ignore for the time the beliefs, aims and. 
particular conditions which belong to you in the other world of reality. ,,11 
Professor Bradley concedes that "there is plenty of conneetion between 
life and poetr,y," but it is an "underground connection." The real world is in 
no way a measure of poetic value, for the only test of artistic worth "lies 
l°Batcher, p. 374. 
pp. 4~!.c.Bradley, OEf'ord Lecture~ .2!! Poetry, 2nd ed. (London, 19,0), 
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simply in the question whether it satisfies our imagination. n12 
Such a notion of art as a complete, 8.utonom:ms reality wholly independent 
of the "beliefs, aims, and particular conditions" of the world in 1fhich we live 
poses several serious diff1culties. As Verdenius has observed: "If artistic 
value is to be judged entirely from within, the essence of a work of art is 
supposed to lie in its harmony, in its formal beauty.ttl) Some critics have 
actual17 accepted such a position. L.W.Peck, tor example, maintains tha.t 
artistiC apprec1ation is nothing more than the pleasure consequent upon obser-
ving phenomenal forms.14 S. Alexander Similarly holdS that to appreciate art 
is to "delight in construction itself.nlS Hhether A.C" Bradley would care to go 
as tar as this, is not altogether clear. Nevertheless, his position is cer-
tainly open to such an interpretation. For in neglecting the "content" aspect 
of art, he ralls into that category of thinkers, condemned 80 vigorously by 
Pla to, who are enthralled by the play of colors and forms. 16 
J.s Rhys Carpenter has pointed out, the representational element in art i1!J 
quite as iIq)Ol"tant as the formal. element. "Pure form to the detriment of rep-
resentational fidelity, or representational f1delity to the detriment of pure 
fona-both are esthetically mistaken} for both tend to suppress an essential 
12Ibid. p. 7. 
-
Ilvel'deniuS, p. )1. 
14z,.W.Beck, "Judgments of Meaning in Art, "Journal: .2£ PhiloS02&. 41. 
(1944), p. 115. Cited in Verdenius. p. 31. 
l5s• Alexander, EhUosopqic~~ !!!l2 L1terarl Pieces (London. 1939), p. 248. 
Cited in Verdenius, p. jl. 
1~!pUb11C 601a, Jowett, p. 475. 
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tactor of the artistic appeal."17 
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By way of lllustration Mr. Carpenter relates the following story about 
himself. 
In a certain London studio I was once shown an inlaid table-top 
whose geometric assortment and arrangement of planes and lines 
were intedded to give me (so I was told) erootions of speed and 
power, of thwarted effort, and energy ready to burst torth. But 
I stood dully by and felt none of this intarsiate vitality rush 
over me. ,for it is not abstract speed and pow8P>,that I can 
understand, but the speed of a raUway train or the power of a 
goaded ox ••• The table-top was a demonstration in pure torm. It 
was also a demonstration of the futUity ot such formal effects 
when they are not i!'l'!lllRnent in the Ulusion of sensuous o'bjects, 
amid whose time and space we put ourselves with that strange 
8,1mpathetlc power which we employ whenever we see picture in a 
mere square of painted cloth.18 
Lines, cUl"'9'es, mass, colors and all the other It formal *1 elslYSnts are essen .. 
tiltl to the artist's work, but the representlonal upect is equally important. 
When Plato called arts "imitative" this is precisely what he pointed out. 
But Bradley's theory presents another difficulty. He insists that the 
artist is a "creator" who brings into existence not a copy of an already ex-
isting being, but sontething new, something unique. The artist is tree, he is 
not bound down to any model. Plato's theory, therefore, is deficient since it 
faUs to do justice to this creat ive aspect of art. 
i"irst of all, it mst be confessed that Plato did not eJltlhaSize the notiOll 
of creation in art. fut as Verden ius has pOinted out: Ills there no danger in 
proclaiming the freedom of artistic creation? ,,19 Was not Pla.to correct when hE 
17Rb7S Carpenter, The Esthetic Easis of Greek Art, (Bryn Mawr, 1921) p. 51 ~ 
18 Ibiq.. p • .39. 
19Verden1US, p. 3.3. 
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warned against those artists who pass their Ulusions off as something totally 
new?20 The history of art can answer this question for us. "t\'henaver artis-
tic imagination has taken al-solute power, freedom has degenerated into caprice, 
creation into jugglery, and expression into selt-idolization. It hns too often 
been forgot ten that the artist is not himSelf a Muse J but a t servant of the 
liuse •• tl21 The artist possesses freedom to a degree, but he "is restricted by 
the fact that he lives in a given world. So he cannot create new realities, 
but can only try to give new interpretations of reality. ,,22 
Imagination has its place in art, to be sure, as Fr.adley mentions. But 
L>naginatlon is no absolute rronarch possetlsing despotic sovereignty. The ill8-
ginatlon mst work upon the realities which the senses and the intellect per-
celve. Therefore, although the artist creates in one sense, he nevertheless 
imitates in another. 
One final objection should be conSidered. Some years ago Carleton L. 
Brownson published an article entitled "Reasons for Plato's Hostility to the 
Poets. D23 In that article Prownson comes to the conclusion that Plato's meta-
physical argument against the poets given in the tenth book of the RepubliC is 
UIIJ}re naive sophtstrytl and that Plato prouably did not want us to take it seri .... 
ously. DIn Book X we cannot help feeling that Plato in following Whither the 
20S9Phist 234, Jowett, III. pp. 382-383. 
2lverdenius, p. 33. 
22Ib1d• 
-
23carleton L. Erownson, "Reasons for Plato's Hostility to the Poets," 
Transactions and Proceediggs of the American Philological Association 28 
( !baton, iS97),pp. s=4i. - - -
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argument leads has forgotten to be broad-minded. Did Plato regard his own work 
this way? It seems to be altogether probable.,,24 Yet as was pointed out ear-
lier, Book X of the !ePubliC, if understood in the light of what Plato tells us 
in Book III, poses no genuine problem. Plato is quite serious in Book X. He 
meant wery word that he said. h'hat we must remember, howwer, is that he is 
speaking there of faulty, second hand imitations that for Plato were not worthy 
or the name hart. II Whether one agrees with Plato f s analysis of ~t as outlined 
in Book X is another question. Eut understood properly, the argudnt there 
presented is typically Platonic and is consistent with what he says about a~ 
elsewhere. 
But as the old sqing has it, "the proof of the pudding is in the eating. tt 
It this adage has any value in matters aesthetieal then it can be said that 
Plato's theory has "proven itsell."· For art critics and philosophers, anCient, 
mediwal, and modern, have eaten of Plato 1 s offerings and have found them al to- . 
gather palatable. The first philosopher to do so was Plato's renowned pupil 
Aristotle. Although the Stagirite disagreed with his teacher on many funda-
mental pOints, he did accept Plato's opinion that the "fine" arts were essen-
tially imitative. 
Naturally, Aristotle changed the ltBaning of the term to fit his more real-
istic philosophy. Actually he did more than that. He "enriched and deepened 
its signification" by interpreting it anew. 25 fut basically the concept is the 
same, as will become evident. 
Protessor futcher seems to infer that It imitation" was, as it were, the 
24 ~., p. 12, 
25ButCher, p. 122. 
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specific difference by which Aristotle distinguished the "fine" from the "use-
ful" arts.26 fut as McKeon points out the "useful" arts are just as imitative 
for Aristotle as the "fine.,,27 In the opinion ot the present writer, Mr. 
Mdteon'S point is well taken for two reasons. 
First of all, consider the purpose or aim of the practical artisan. As 
Aristotle pointed out, he attempts to supply tor man those necessary or useful 
items with which nature has not equipped him. By using his rational powers 
the artisan comes to naturets aid and fulfUls her uncoJTPleted purpose. Where 
nature has failed, art rushes to the rescue. The medical art is a good example 
of this, the polltica.l art is another. In these cases and others the "useful" 
arts "supply the deficiencies of nature. p28 
But the useful artisan takes not only his aim or purpose from nature. He 
also copies nature's method. Thus in building a house the artisan proceeds 
just as nature would proceed if she were in the habit of producing houses. 
Like naturehGf':lt an efficient cause with a definite intention or purpose in 
mind, In oth&.~ words a finis. Like nature he works with certain materials 
(cau .. matenalis) so as to produce an object of a certain form (causa 
formalis.)29 In other words, the practical artist imitates nature's process in 
completing her unfulfilled designs. 
Similarly, the so called tt fine" arts imitate nature according to the 
Aristotelian theory. They differ from the "useful" in their end. "For they 
26xbld. p. 121. 
-
27McKeon, "Literary Criticism and the Concept of Imitation," p. 161. 
~8Aristotle, Politics, IV, 17, l337a, 1-2. 
29Butcher, p. 117-120. 
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have no o'ther end beyond the pe rfection of the ir product as determined by 
their object and the means they employ."30 The purpose of imitation in the 
"tina" arts 18 not utility. Rather the painter or the poet attempts to pro-
duce a beautiful work for its own sake, something that will be a source of de-
light to all beholders. The object which they represent is "men in action."3l 
For Arts'totle, then, the fine arts imitate nature, though for a different 
purpose and in a different manner. When employing the phrase "art imitates 
nature" with regard to the "fine" arts, one must be careful to understand it 
in its strict Aris'totelian sense. For eDR{lle, the Engli.sh verb "imitates" 
does injustice to Aristotle' 8 precise meaning. It connotes a slavish fidelity 
of the copy to its model, a notion wholly foreign to Aristotle's mind. Perhaps 
it would be more correct to say "art represents nature, takes its lead from 
nature, uses the objects of nature as its model." 
Similarly, the term "nature" must be taken in its philosophical sense. 
l"or us "'nature" signifies the created world around us. It is synonymous with 
the "great ont of doors," the babbling brook, the roaring vim, the towering 
mountains, the field of daf'fodils with which the l'Ol1f3.ntic poets of a centul:'7 
ago were fond of communing.· :&1t for Aristotle it meant something far differ-
ent. It was rather the creative foree, the productive principle of each and 
eyery be1ng.J2 Or 'to put it more philosophically, the nature is the essence 
of a thing in so far as that essence is the source of the being's activity. 
JOMcKeon, "Literary CritiCism,· p. 161. 
31Aristotle, PoetiCS, 2, 1448, &1. 
32Eutcher, p. 116. 
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Once one understands the precise meaning ot the term "nature" he can ap-
preclate why Aristotle maintained that "men in action" were the objects to be 
imitated in the "fine" arts. After all, what in this vast universe of' ours is 
ot greater interest to man than man himself? Does it not seem only natural, 
then, that man should imitate man in his art? Not, however, static, inactive, 
lifeless man. Such a representation would be tarcieal and essentially untrue 
since man by his very nature is an active, vital, intelligent being. And atter 
all, it is his nature that art 1mi tates. 
Dr. Butcher is very right when he remarks that the tl fme" arts imitate 
tlever,ything that expresses the mental life, that reveals a rational person-
JIlt 
alit,. ,,3.3 Among these qualities ot rational personality we might list '1(1"1 or 
characteristic moral qualities, those pennanent dispositions of the mind which 
, 
reveal a certain condition ot will; ",<d)"" the more transient emotions, the 
, 
pass ing moods ot feell.n~u 1l~ ~ E L S J that internal, immanent activity of _n 
"from which foree flows to the exterior". True, the artist imitates man t s ex-
ternal activity. rut the external is ~aningless unless the interior is also 
portrayed. UntU the artist gives us a glimpse inside the man he has not re-
presented tor us the mants rational, moral nature. "An act viewed merely as an 
external process or result, one of a series of outward phenomena, is not the 
, 
true object ot aesthetiC imitation. The71PC-~(lS that art seeks to reproduce is 
mainly an inward process, a PS1chical energy working outwards. "34 
While Aristotle very definitely enriched the PlatoniC concept ot artistiC 
"imitation" in a variety ot ways, he was at one with his teacher in maintaining 
• 




that Ii work of art was "an idealized representation of haTtan lite ander forms 
manifest to sense. nJ5 Naturally the t~o men did not mean precisely the same 
thing when they employed the term "idealized" because their epistemologies 
were essentially diflerent. Nevertheless, both were eager to remind US that 
truly noble art never devolved into nat, slavish realism. li'or, as .Aristotle 
pOinted out, the true artist follows the 1atimations and guidance of nature it-
self. "He aims at sOl!'8thing better <(3tArio", than the actual. He produces a 
new thing, not Ii copy of reality but a higher re&1ity--for the ideal type 
~8£lr,4olQ) must surpass the actu81."36 
The concrete, existing man, Aristotle pOinted out, is singular and par-
ticular, but the art1st is interested in a higher and "better" reality, he 
strives to capture the universal aspect of man and to represent this in the 
medium of his art. Such activity is surely not a slavish reproducing of natar~ 
. In fact, ·"Imitation,' so understood, is a creative act.. To seize the miver-
sal, and to reproduce it in simple and sensuous form is not to reflect a real ... 
ity already familiar through sense perceptions; rather it is a rivalry of na-
ture I a completion of her unfulfUled purposes, a correction of her fall ures.-)i 
To produce such a work: requires a profound and penetrating insight into 
the workings of' human natare. It presupposes a deep appreCiation and a ter.rlet 
regard for man, his problems, hiS aspirations, his deSires, and so forth. In 
this matter also ,Aristotle agreed. wholeheartedly with what Plato had. written in 
the Timaeus about ill-informed poets. nNow I, Critias and Hermocrates, am 
J5Ibid. p. 15J. 
36]:bid. p. 152. 
-
J7Ib1d. p. 154. 
-
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conscious that I Jqfself should never 'be able to celebrate the city and her 
citizens in a befitting manner, and I am not. surprised at my own inoapacitYJ 
to me the 1«)nder is rather that the poets present as well as past are no bet-
ter--not that I mean to deprec iate them; but everyone can see that they are a 
tribe of imitators and will imitate best and most easily the 11£e in which they 
have been brought up, while that which is beyond the range of a man '8 education 
he finds hard ••• adequately to represent in language. n)8 
But the concept of artistic imitation did not die with Aristotle. True, 
its meaning underwent a radical change, but it remained a part of the literary 
critic's vocabulary right down to and including Roman times. Yet, as might be 
expected, the lesser lights of succeeding generations were unable to penetrate 
or appreciate the wisdom of the Stagirlte. As the years pas~ the notion of 
imitation lost its place of distinction in the discussions on art and litera-
ture. Though it was not negleoted altogether, it was relegated to a second 
place and took on unusual. and decidedly non-Platonic, non-AriBtotelian 
meanings. 
For example, when we look into the works of Cicero, or Qulntilian, or 
Dionys.1a3 of Bel.icarnaaus we find that tIle;y use the word imitation to mean the 
imitation of recognized writers of the past. The treatise.2!! .-I;;:mi;;;.;:t;.;;a..;;;t.1. . . oo.;;;,;D by 
Dionysius consisted of three parts, the first treated of imitation in general, 
the second on the choice of writers for imitation, and the third on the proper 
methods of imitation. According to him imitation 1.8 a "copying ot models with 
the help of certain prinCiples_ n39 Longinus likewise regards "zealous 
3Brimaeus 19d, Jowett, III, p. 707. 
39DionysiUS of Halicarnasus, On Imitation, Jl, iii (28) cited in Md\eon, 
"Literary Critieism,,-"p. 169. - ,." 
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imitation of the great historians and poets of the past as one of the roads 
which leads to sublimity.n40 As good a suggestion as this is, it is clearlY 
ai. non-fi,ristotelian use of the term tlimitation. tt 
Did the later ages abandon the Platonic-Arlstoteltan notion of artistic 
fl imitation" altogether? I:y no means. However, where Aristotle had inS isted 
that "men in action" were to be imitated, these critics stressed the imitation 
of character and even natural, lifeless objects. Plutarch marks this transi ... 
tion to the imitation of natural objects quite clearly. "Imitation is of 
actions, or works or things. ,,41 Longinus also employed the term in much the 
same way as Plutarch: "Best prose writers by use of inversions imitate nature. 
For art is only perfect when it looks like nature. "42 
ThiS, after all, was the age of rhetoric and its writers were more con-
cerned with principles and criteria of rhetoric. Imitation, as a result, moves 
to a place of secondary importance. fa McKeon has remarked: "Although nRture 
still supplies the object of imitation, imitation is no longer the central con-
capt, either in the sense of Plato or in that of Aristotle, about which the 
analysis of poetry is organized.n43 
In Horace's day the concept of artistic "imitation" retained its place of 
secondary importance. At that time IJthere grew up a generation of critics, or 
numerous and long-lived progeny, who judged literature ~ considering its 
4ot,onginuS, .2!!!t!. Sublime, 22. Cited in McKeon, p. 169. 
4lPlutarch, ESSayS 2.!l Poe¥".l, 3. Cited in Me,Keon, p. 170. 
42Longinu8, .s!! ~ Sublime, 22. 
4~dteon, Literary Criticism," p. 172. 
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effect on the audience. n44 The commonly accepted opinion of the day was that, 
although a poet may imitate that which is, in other words, the actions of men 
or the objects of nature, his prinCipal task is to please his audience. 
Horace himself reminds the would-be artists "It is not enough for poems to 
have beauty. They must also be pleasing and lead the listenerts soul whither 
they will... If the speaker's words are inconsistent with his fortunes a Ro~an 
audience, high and low Will roar with lau~hter. ,,45 Horace has any number of 
practical hints for the would-be playwright on how to keep the audience in 
their seats until the end .. on how to arouse their applause .. or in other words, 
how to please them. Horace does concede, however, that faithful imitation will 
further this particular end. The hopeful young poet is encouraged to imitate 
models from lite am the customs of men.46 He is 1.1lcewise advised to study 
very carefully aDd consciously imitate the ancient Greek works especially the 
dialogues of Plato.47 
Suc. renowned Stoics as Seneca and Marcus Aurelius accepted the ancieat 
belief that "art imitates nature." Seneca, the philosopher-tutor of llero, in a 
letter to his friend Lucilius once expressed the opinion. that "All art is an ' 
imitation of nature. n48 For Marcus AureliUS nature itself is an art and art an 
imitation. "Nature is never inferior to art and tirt is an imitation of 
44Ibid. p. 113. 
-
4SHorace, !!:1!!! Poetry, II, pp. 99-112. 
46rbid. p. 130. 
-
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nature.,,49 Aurelius goes on to remark that Buch artistic imitation, whether 
of men or actions, is good artistically if it embodies values which are not 
themselves perceived by the senses. Clearly, then, he did not advocate slav-
ish realism. 
The most famous of the pagan neo-Platonists, Plotinus, is quite faithful 
to the doctrine of Plato in this matter. 
If anyone despises the arts because they create only imitations 
of nature, it should be pointed out first that natural things 
likewlse are imitations of other things, secondly that the arts 
do not imitate visible objects directly but iount to the reasons 
frOM which nature derives, and finally that they create many 
things themselves and add that which 1s lacking to the perfection 
or the object because the;r possess in themselves ( .. aut,.. Phidias 
made Zeus without reference to any visible model, but rather im-
agined him as he would be u: he consented to appear to our eyes.50 
Plato.s theory is very much in evidence in these words. Not only is art 
an imitation according to Plotillus, but natural objects are imitations as well, 
a concept highly reminiscent of the Platonic dialogues. Secondly, the artist 
imitates not mere appearances, but the reasons or ideas of which the phenomena 
are but imperfect copies. Another doctrine full of Platonic echoes. 
During the era of the Renaissance the Platonic not ion of art as imi ta.tiO:l\) 
was the commonly accepted doctrine. As Dr. McKeon has remarked: "Literary 
criticism was strongly influenced during the Renaissance by the Platonic tra-
dition, with its conception of the im1t.ation of the ideal, and by the rhetori-
cal tradition, With its conception of the imitation or the artist and of hil 
writings, as developed by Cicero, Horace, Quintllian, and Longinus. ft 51 
49Karcus Aurelius, 12 Himself, xi, 10. 
50notinus, Enneads v,8 ,1. Cited in TeouSht, Action !.!!! PaSSion, r,. 
Richard McKeon ~ChicagoJ 1954), p. 123. 
SlMcKeon, Thought, Action ~ PaSSion, p. 175. 
70 
During the Seventeenth century and the first half of the Eighteenth cen-
tury we find the philosophers commonly employing the term" imitation" to dis-
tinguish art from nature and to mark the relation between the two. Not all ~ 
them, of course, agreed on precisely what the term meant. Nor could they 
agree on Which arts were imitative am which not. rut that flimitationlt DS a 
concept basic to the understanding and appreciation of art was quite univer-
sally acknowledged by such leading critics as Eatteaux and Lessing and others~ 
\~ithin lION recent ti~s the term "imitationJ1 has fallen into disrepute 
and 1s no longer a prominent one in the vocabulary of critics.53 Rarely does 
one run across the word "imitation" in a philosophical analysis of art, and 
wen in these cases the writer is l1'Ost careful to assure the reader that he 
does not mean a "literal representation of the Object. It Bernard Fosanquet has 
expressed the modern critics' opinion in this matter quite well when he wrote: 
tilt is natural that the earliest formula adopted l::w reflection should be 
strained to the breaking point before it was acandoned. u54 The obvious impli-
cation is, of course, that the "early forrmlla," namely imitation, having 
reached the breaking point, has been abandoned. And it must be admitted that 
at least the last put of tosanquet's statement is true. Modern aesthetics 
has in large part abandoned the term. 
For art, many modern critics insist, is essentially a creative, not an 
imitative act. S5 It 1s self-expreSSion, the externalizing of one's feelings 
S2Ibid. p. 180. 
-
S3verdentus, pp. 1-2. 
54Bernard Eosanquet,! History,2£ Aesthetics, 4 ed. (London,1911), p. 13. 




and emotions, not the mere copying of nature. It is not the present writer's 
purpose to evaluate, much less criticize, this modern point of view. In so far 
as these notions nave been proposed as refutation of Platots doctrine they have 
been considered earlier. What we would like to point out is simply this. It 
would be wrong for the present student of art to conclude that the ancient no-
tion of artistic "imitation" is to .be rejected •. 
As a matter of fact, several rather rrominent critics of our day have seen 
fit to e~loy the concept in their work. Anong these we find the name of 
Jacques Maritain. In his boot ~ ~ Scholasticism, Martaln writesl "Art is 
tundamental.ly constructive and creative. It is the faculty of prodUCing, not 
of course .!! nihilo, but out of a pre-existing matter, a new creature, an ori-
ginal being capable in its turn of moving a hUman soul. ,,56 
On the other hand Maritain remarks that lInature is in the first place a 
stimulus and a check to artists... They (artists) imitate her in a truly fU-
ial spirit, and according to the creative agUity of the spirit, but their imi-
tation is not literal and serrile. n57 
In his DW)St recent took Marltain expresses the same sentiments. 
Yet the fact remains that this genuine concept of imitation, cor-
rectly understood, expresses a necessity to which human art is 
bound... For without the instrumentality of natural appearances 
made present or trepresented' in such a way, the intended manifes-
tation cannot be intuitive, that is the work falls short of the 
essence or art. As I ha"e previously noticed, it is through the 
instrumentality ot natural appearances that things reveal some of 
their secretmaan1ngs to the artist's intuition, it is also through 
the instrumentality of natural appearances ••• that the same secret 
meaning can be intuitively rev"!aled in and by the work. Taken in 
56Jacques Maritain, !!:! !!l2 Scholasticism, p. 6.3. 





this correct phUosophical sense, the law of • il1l1tation' (mialead .. 
ing as this unhappy word m.§l be) .. the law of transference or re-
production is inescapable.5ij 
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Mortimer Adler is even more emphatic in his espousal of the ancient con-
cept. In his book, ~.!a2 Prudence .. he mentions quite frankly that "the baslc 
principle in the analysis of any work of art 1s that it is an imitation of na-
ture... To say that the motion picture is a work: of art is to say no more than 
that it is sozrething made 1:ty man and hence an imitation. ,,59 
Elswwhere Mr. lIdler remarks, "Art imitates nature, first in that mating as 
a process is an imitation of natural processes and second, in that the ~h1ng 
art1.ficially made is an imitat.ion at: a natural thing (or more generally a crea-
ture of God.) .,60 
Other modern philosophers too have come to the conclusion that there very 
definitely is an imitative aspect to art. 
The return of timitation' to basic importance in the discussion of 
poetry during the last fifteen or twenty years is an important sign 
both of the problems of contemporaxy aesthetics and critiCism and 
of the av'aUab1l1ty of new devices for the treatment of 1"&current 
dilemmas and oppositions. Crocets somewhat grudging defense of a 
proper meaning of imitation, Santayana's wholehearted employment of 
the concept as central to reason in art, were earlier preparations 
tor the recognition of problems which have led to the more recent 
inSights into the implications and appl1cations of lmltation.61 
Clear1" then, the Platonic concept has exercised a good deal of influence 
58Jacques Haritain, Creative Intuition in A.rt and Poetrz (Kingsport, 1953). 
p. 225. - - - - - • 
59Mortimer J. Adler, .!tl !!!!. Prudence (New York, 1937), p. 459. 
~ortimer J. Adler, ~Creation and Imitation," Proceedings of the 
American Catholio Philosophical Association, Vol. n, (f93S', p."'I~ 
61Mcl eon, 'l'hough,t, Action, !!!.2, Passion. p. 174. 
L 
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in the hlstor,y of literary and artistic criticism. To be sure, the notion ot 
imitation underwent an alteration of neaning with every new philosopher who 
e.rq:>loyed it. Some, like Aristotle, enriched its significance immeasurably, 
whUe others, incapable of grasping its full meaning, used it incorrectly. 
That the concept has rnanaged to survive so long would seem to indicate that it 
possesses at least a basic validity. 
This last remark, however, should not be miSinterpreted. It is not our 
contention that the Platonic concept of "imitation" should be ~dopted pre-
cisely as it was enuntiated qy Plato himself. Such a proposal would be as 
naive a8 it would be unrealistio. Clearly, much scholarly work has been done 
in the field of' artistic analysis since Platots day which cannot in all intel-
lectual honesty be disregarded. Furthermore, PIa to t s aesthetics has its roots 
buried deep in the soil ot his metaphysics and epistemology. To accept one is 
to accept a good deal of the other. Many a present day philosopher would be 
exceedingly reluctant to do this, and underatandatly so. ~~o, for example, 
would accept Plato f s theory of subsistent Ideas? HOII many would be willing to 
look upon the world of sense experience as a faulty imperfect copy of reality? 
Their nwj)er, without doubt, l.Jould be exceedingly few. 
On the other hand, Plato's point of view is not without its relevance, 
and this is the point which the present study has tried to make. Understood 
properly, Plato1s analysis of artts nature can be quite instructive. Ey plac-
ing the emphasis on "1mit.ation" he warned uS against excessive formalism and 
subjectivism. At the same time he has pointed out the role of both realism and 
idealism in art. It''urther, he has put us on our guard against mere photographic 
copying, on the one hand, and esoteric subjectivism, on the other. For thiS, 
it for nothing else, Plato deserves our sincerest "thanks." 
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